Toothless Dragon? The “Five Incapables” of the Chinese Military

The Chinese military, known more formally as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has long been a force shrouded in mystery and mythology. From glossy propaganda videos to choreographed parades, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) projects an image of unstoppable military modernization. But inside the ranks, cracks are showing. Among the most telling is a quietly acknowledged internal critique known as the “Five Incapables” (五个不会)—a set of leadership failures so endemic that they’re publicly discussed by the PLA’s own institutions.

It’s a phrase that should concern military planners and strategic thinkers across the Indo-Pacific: a sign that China’s military isn’t nearly as competent—or as ready—as it wants the world to believe.

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What Are the “Five Incapables”?

In his article “The Dragon’s Shadow: Shedding Light on China’s Military Challenges,” featured in West Point’s Modern War Journal, Noah Jager explains that the “Five Incapables” is PLA shorthand for the following leadership deficiencies:

1. Incapable of effectively judging a situation
2. Incapable of understanding higher authorities’ intentions
3. Incapable of making operational decisions
4. Incapable of effectively planning and leading troop deployments
5. Incapable of dealing with unexpected situations in a VUCA* environment

In simpler terms, many PLA officers can’t think critically, can’t interpret orders, can’t plan effectively, can’t maneuver, and can’t adapt when things go sideways. This is a damning indictment of a military whose strategic ambitions extend from the Himalayas to the Taiwan Strait.

These deficiencies came to light in the wake of reforms launched by President Xi Jinping, who sought to modernize and professionalize a force riddled with corruption and stagnation. The problem? When political loyalty outranks merit and initiative is punished as insubordination, you get generals who can quote doctrine—or Sun Tzu–but can’t fight wars. That stands in stark contrast to the US military’s Mission Command leadership paradigm.

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Command Paralysis and Political Shackles

The PLA is not merely a national army, it is the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party. This is a crucial distinction. Every officer in the PLA answers first to the party, then to their chain of command. Every unit is embedded with political commissars, whose role is to monitor ideological conformity, not tactical effectiveness. The result is a top-down, micromanaged structure where independent thinking is discouraged and failure is often concealed.

This political grip has bred a command culture that fears making mistakes. Chinese officers often hesitate to act without explicit direction from above. In fluid, fast-moving battlefields—like those likely over Taiwan or in the South China Sea—this paralysis could be fatal.

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Why This Matters: The Taiwan Test

If China invades Taiwan, it won’t be a parade—it’ll be the most complex amphibious operation since D-Day. Success would require seamless joint operations, agile battlefield decisions, and commanders empowered to adapt. The Five Incapables suggest the PLA may be dangerously unprepared for such a fight.

Consider this: how do you lead an amphibious landing when junior officers can’t interpret battlefield shifts, when brigade commanders won’t deviate from script, and when no one below the Central Military Commission is trusted to innovate under fire?

The US military has spent two decades fighting insurgents who adapt in real time. American junior leaders are trained to assess, decide, and act without waiting for orders from on high. This is the kind of decentralized initiative that the PLA fears—and currently lacks.

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Lessons for US and Allied Forces

The Five Incapables do not mean the PLA is entirely toothless. China is building a navy faster than any nation in history. It has advanced missiles, cyber warfare units, and a growing space force. But behind this high-tech façade are human factors that still lag: an inflexible command structure, untested officers, and a doctrine more Soviet than modern.

US and allied forces should take note—not to underestimate China, but to focus on asymmetric advantages. Information warfare, rapid maneuver, electronic jamming, and real-time targeting will exploit PLA decision bottlenecks. And while China drills for the “perfect” fight, we should be preparing to fight messy. And to many analysts, it seems like a fight is indeed coming.

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Conclusion: Not Ready for Prime Time

The Five Incapables are more than just a pejorative—they’re a warning to the world from within China itself. They reveal a Chinese military struggling to bridge the gap between ambition and capability. For the U.S. military and its partners, the lesson is clear: the PLA may be modernizing rapidly, but war isn’t won by machines alone. It’s won by people who can think, lead, and adapt under pressure. And by that standard, the People’s Liberation Army still has a long way to go.

However, the first step in getting help for a problem is admitting that you have one. And the reason the West knows about the 5 Incapables in the first place–or at least the details of it–is because of China’s internal self-reporting. The PLA isn’t great right now, not in the ways that really matter, but they’re trying to get there.

And that’s something we should all pay attention to.

*VUCA: volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous

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Charles Faint served over 27 years in the US Army, which included seven combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan with various Special Operations Forces units and two stints as an instructor at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He also completed operational tours in Egypt, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea and earned a Doctor of Business Administration from Temple University as well as a Master of Arts in International Relations from Yale University. He is the owner of The Havok Journal, and the views expressed herein are his own and do not reflect those of the US Government or any other person or entity.

As the Voice of the Veteran Community, The Havok Journal seeks to publish a variety of perspectives on a number of sensitive subjects. Unless specifically noted otherwise, nothing we publish is an official point of view of The Havok Journal or any part of the U.S. government.