While there is little to no evidence of operational use of biological weapons, there were suspicious outbreaks that led to speculative biological weapons leaks from known USSR biological research labs. One indication of a Soviet BW program was a sudden outbreak in Sverdlovsk, Russia. The incident occurred on April 1979 when an “anthrax aerosol was released from the USSR Ministry of Defence’s Scientific-Research Institute of Bacterial Vaccine Preparations, part of Military Compound Number 19 in Sverdlovsk.”[lxvi] This outbreak led to sixty-eight deaths in the city. Thus, it indicated to the U.S. that the Soviet Union began an offensive BW program. One of the responsible organizations for the Soviet Union’s BW program was a civilian biotechnology facility known as Biopreparat. The civilian facility was used as a façade that on the surface focused on microbiology and genetics research.[lxvii] From 1970 to 1980, the Biopreparat constructed the Stepnogorsk Scientific Experimental-Industrial Base (SNOPB) which produced three hundred metric tons of weaponized anthrax.[lxviii] In the same year an outbreak of smallpox occurred in Aralsk, Kazakhstan.
The smallpox outbreak struck a small city on the shore of the Aral Sea nearby a known Soviet Union BW facility. The Soviet Union constructed the facility located on Vozrozhdenie Island in the Aral Sea during Stalin’s dictatorship in 1952 to conduct BW experiments. Soon after in 1954, Stalin’s lasting BW legacy constructed the base Aral’sk-7.[lxix] The CIA described the base on Vozrozhdenie as semi-isolated and three hundred miles from the nearest shore of the Aral Sea. The CIA stated, “Approximately 60 square miles are useable…Vozrozhdenie’s comparative isolation in the Aral Sea, the extensive expanse of water downwind from the island, and its surrounding desert regions provide considerable latitude in the type of weapons which can be studied.”[lxx] Furthermore, the CIA reported that the base on the island established the Red Army’s Scientific-Research Institute of Epidemiology and Hygiene, Krov (NIIEG) to research and develop large quantities of BW agents such as anthrax, plague, tularemia, and brucellosis. The CIA also believed that the NIIEG produced dispersing devices for the aforementioned BW agents.[lxxi] As established, the base on Vozrozhdenie Island was a known BW facility that routinely field-tested BW agents. In 1971, the outbreak of smallpox in Aralsk, Kazakhstan coincided with field-testing operations on Vozrozhdenie Island.
The smallpox outbreak was unusual in Aralsk because the Soviet Union eradicated smallpox in the USSR in 1931 and the outbreak was not reported to the WHO. The smallpox eradication program required all participating nations to report any cases of smallpox.[lxxii] Located on the island was an open-air test site that tested various BW agents using an aerosol sprayer and exploding bombs to detect dispersion patterns of each BW agent. The Soviet Union used this facility because prevalent winds moved along a north-south axis, and its isolation made the risk of aerosolized pathogens reaching populated areas extremely low.[lxxiii] However, according to a report from Director Misaleva to Professor M.A. Aykimbaev, it was concluded that Patient #1 contracted smallpox in late July 1971 during a research expedition in the Aral Sea on the vessel Lev Berg.[lxxiv]
The official report of the smallpox outbreak in Aralsk concluded that Patient #1 contracted the disease while at port, but Dr. Alan P. Zelicoff of Sandia National Laboratories interviewed Patient #1 and came to a different conclusion. According to Dr. Zelicoff, Patient #1 contradicted the official report when she insisted that she never disembarked at any ports during the expedition. Moreover, no other ship crew members contracted smallpox, so she could not have contracted it from her shipmates. Instead, Dr. Zelicoff hypothesizes that the Lev Berg was 15km south of Vozrozhdenie Island, and Patient #1, according to her interview, was working on the top deck taking samples and was exposed to the open-air testing when 400 grams of smallpox was exploded into the air.[lxxv]
Afterward, Patient #1 arrived at the port town of Aralsk and infected her brother and eventually the outbreak spread to seven other people. In total nine people were infected with smallpox and three died from hemorrhagic fevers. Dr. Zelicoff points to the hemorrhagic fevers as evidence that this smallpox virus variation was unusual. For example, Dr. Zelicoff explains, “Although the Aralsk outbreak data are insufficient to support a firm conclusion, the seemingly high percentage of hemorrhagic cases and the skewing of the distribution to very young children suggest that either unusual ‘host factors’ or an unusual strain of the virus, were responsible for this distinctive feature of the Aralsk outbreak.”[lxxvi] To further validate his claims, Zelicoff compared the infection rate to Pakistan and concluded that the Aralsk strain was more infectious than traditional strains.[lxxvii] If the evidence provided by Dr. Zelicoff proves to be credible, then it will reveal that, in fact, the Soviet Union weaponized smallpox and the strain infected Aralsk. Dr. Zelicoff’s evidence, however, undoubtedly shows a definite correlation between the outbreak of smallpox and a nearby known biological weapon testing facility.
Though the alliance between the U.S. and USSR to eradicate smallpox displayed a triumph for humanity, Cold War politics prevailed when both nations pursued biological weapons and undermined the efforts of an international community of doctors, microbiologists, scientists, and epidemiologists. Dr. Henderson, Dr. Foege, and many others that worked for the WHO during the eradication program called upon the U.S. and Russia to destroy all stocks of smallpox virus to prevent any weaponization of the virus and finally rid humankind of it. Dr. Henderson argued that if both the U.S. and Russia destroyed their stockpiles, then it would lead the rest of the world to never produce or stockpile biological weapons. However, there is a chance that countries such as Iran or North Korea would follow suit and not pursue a BW program.
Thus, Dr. Henderson and immunologists suggest that the U.S. should start stockpiling vaccines and prepare for bioterrorism.[lxxviii] In the end, the U.S. and Russia would continue their BW programs to develop defenses and combat against BW agents that threatened their borders. While destroying stockpiles of smallpox viruses would have been a symbolic gesture, it could have proven detrimental to national security if either country were attacked with a weaponized variation of the smallpox viruses. By keeping a stockpile of smallpox viruses, it allowed the U.S. and Russia to continue to research and develop vaccines against the virus. In addition, even today, if there ever is a reintroduction of smallpox, both nations would be readily available to respond especially since there is a rise in outbreaks of monkeypox becoming endemic in West Africa. Therefore, the BW program conducted by the U.S. and Soviet Union contradicted the Smallpox Eradication Program and the efforts by the WHO, but the research and development of the BW program for defensive purposes have proven beneficial as it allows for the development of immunizations and early detection systems.
[i] World Health Organization, The Global Eradication of Smallpox: Final Report of the Global Commission for the Certification of Smallpox Eradication, (Public Health, Geneva: World Health Organization, 1980), 44.
[ii] William H. Foege, House on Fire: The Fight to Eradicate Smallpox, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011), 185.
[iii] Richard Preston, The Demon in the Freezer: A True Story,(New York: The Random House Publishing Group, 2002), 87.
[iv] Preston, The Demon in the Freezer, 87.
[v] “Asia Is Reported Free of Smallpox for the First Time in History.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 14 Nov. 1975, www.nytimes.com/1975/11/14/archives/asia-is-reported-free-of-smallpox-for-the-first-time-in-history.html.
[vi] Preston, Demon in the Freezer, 89.
[vii] D.A. Henderson, Smallpox-The Death of a Disease: The Inside Story of Eradicating a Worldwide Killer (New York: Prometheus Books, 2009), 33.
[viii] Foege, House on Fire, 7.
[ix] World Health Organization, The Global Eradication of Smallpox, 24.
[x] The WHA is a forum for the WHO where 194 member states send their health ministers to vote for policies and funding.
[xi] Henderson, The Death of a Disease, 61.
[xii] Henderson, The Death of a Disease, 62.
[xiii] World Health Organization, The Global Eradication of Smallpox, 24-25.
[xiv] World Health Organization, The Global Eradication of Smallpox, 25.
[xv] Henderson, The Death of a Disease, 75.
[xvi] Donald A. Henderson, “Smallpox Eradication: A Cold War Victory,” World Health Forum 1998; 19(2), 118https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/55594.
[xvii] Henderson, The Death of a Disease, 93.
[xviii] Henderson, “A Cold War Victory,” 115.
[xix] Henderson, The Death of a Disease, 69.
[xx] Henderson, The Death of a Disease, 76.
[xxi] Henderson, The Death of a Disease, 77.
[xxii] Henderson, The Death of a Disease, 101-102.
[xxiii] Henderson, “A Cold War Victory,” 117.
[xxiv] Henderson, The Death of a Disease, 104.
[xxv] World Health Organization, The Global Eradication of Smallpox, 107-108.
[xxvi] World Health Organization, The Global Eradication of Smallpox, 30.
[xxvii] Henderson, The Death of a Disease, 81.
[xxviii] Foege, House on Fire, 51.
[xxix] Foege, House on Fire, 102.
[xxx] World Health Organization, The Global Eradication of Smallpox, 31.
[xxxi] Foege, House on Fire, 55.
[xxxii] Foege, House on Fire, 57.
[xxxiii] Foege, House on Fire, 57.
[xxxiv] Foege, House on Fire, 59.
[xxxv] World Health Organization, The Global Eradication of Smallpox, 37.
[xxxvi] Foege, House on Fire, 86.
[xxxvii] Foege, House on Fire, 164.
[xxxviii] Foege, House on Fire, 164.
[xxxix] World Health Organization, The Global Eradication of Smallpox, 45.
[xl] Foege, House on Fire, 182.
[xli] Foege, House on Fire, 115.
[xlii] Foege, House on Fire, 184.
[xliii] U.S. Army Activity in the U.S. Biological Warfare Programs (Volumes I and II), U.S. Department of the Army, February 24, 1977, reprinted in Biological Testing Involving Human Subjects by the Department of Defense, 1977, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Committee on Human Resources, March 8 and May 23, 1977, United States Senate, 95th Congress, First Session (U.S. GPO, 1977), 25.
[xliv] U.S. Army Activity, 26.
[xlv] List of pathogens at Pine Bluff Arsenal; Antipersonnel: Brucellosis, Pasteurella, tularemia, Q fever rickettsia, Venezuelan Equine Encephalomyelitis, Bacillus anthracis, Botulinum toxin, and staphylococcal enterotoxin. Anti-Crop: stem rust of wheat and rye and rice blast.
[xlvi]U.S. Army Activity, 76.
[xlvii] National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 59, U.S. Policy on Chemical and Biological Warfare and Agents, from National Security Advisor Henry A. Kissinger to the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence, the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, and the Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 5/28/69. Secret, 1.
[xlviii] Report to the National Security Council, “US Policy on Chemical and Biological Warfare and Agents,” submitted by the Interdepartmental Political-Military Group in response to NSSM 59, November 10, 1969, Top Secret, 15.
[xlix] Report to National Security Council, 24-25.
[l] National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 35, United States Policy on Chemical Warfare Program and Bacteriological/Biological Research Program, from National Security Advisory Henry A. Kissinger to the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, etc., November 25, 1969, Top Secret/Nodis, 2.
[li] National Security Decision Memorandum No. 44, Subject: United States Policy on Toxins, February 20, 1970, Secret.
[lii] Memorandum for the President from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Subject: National Security Decision Memoranda 35 and 44, July 6, 1970, Secret, 2-3.
[liii] Hearings before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate [Church Committee], Ninety-fourth Congress, First Session, Volume I: Unauthorized Storage of Toxic Agents, September 16, 17 and 18, 1975 (U.S. GPO, 1976), 5.
[liv] Hearings before the Select Committee, 6. See Attachment 1 for a comprehensive list of CIA Building inventory.
[lv] Hearings before the Select Committee, 16.
[lvi] See attachment 2 for comprehensive list of CIA inventory maintained by Special Operations Division at Ft. Detrick.
[lvii] Hearings before the Select Committee, 189-191.
[lviii] Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Biological Warfare, CIA-RDP79R01012A025000030001-2, (Central Intelligence Agency: Director of Central Intelligence, 1964), 1.
[lix] Professor V.D. Timakov was an active member of Academy of Medical Sciences USSR that authored the article “To Protect Humanity from the Threat of Biological Warfare.”
[lx] Central Intelligence Agency, Comments on Bacteriological Warfare by a Soviet Scientist, Professor V.D. Timakov, CIA-RDP80-00809A00070090400-6, (Moscow: Monthly Periodical, 1952), 3.
[lxi] Comments on Bacteriological Warfare, 2.
[lxii] Report to National Security Council, 9.
[lxiii] CIA, Soviet Capabilities, and Intentions, 2.
[lxiv] See Attachment #3 for a comprehensive list of possible stockpiled pathogens from the Soviet Union reported by the CIA.
[lxv] Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Chemical and Biological Warfare Program, CIA-RDP87T00051R000200150001-4, (Central Intelligence Agency: Director of Central Intelligence, 1986), 3.
[lxvi] Anthony Rimmington, Stalin’s Secret Weapon: The Origins of Soviet Biological Warfare, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018) 23.
[lxvii] Caitriona McLeish, “Opening Up the Secret City of Stepnogorsk: Biological Weapons in the Former Soviet Union,” (Royal Geographical Society 2010), 60.
[lxviii] Milton Leitenberg, Raymond A. Zilinskas, and Jens H. Kuhn, The Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History, (London: Harvard University Press, 2012), 279.
[lxix] Rimmington, Stalin’s Secret Weapon, 5.
[lxx] “The Soviet BW Programme,” Scientific Intelligence Research Aid, OSI-RA/61-3, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Scientific Intelligence, 24 April 1961, Approved for Release in September 1999, 80.
[lxxi] “The Soviet BW Programme,” 109-110.
[lxxii] Jonathan B. Tucker and Raymond A. Zilinskas, “Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program,” (Critical Reviews in Microbiology 2003), 81.
[lxxiii] Tucker and Zilinskas, “Chemical and Biological Weapons,” 93.
[lxxiv] “OP#09: The 1971 Smallpox Epidemic in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, and the Soviet Biological Warfare Program,” (James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 13 Oct. 2017), www.nonproliferation.org/the-1971-smallpox-epidemic-in-aralsk-kazakhstan-and-the-soviet-biological-warfare-program-commentaries/, 26.
Misaleva: Director Aralomorsk Anti-Plague station
Professor M.A. Aykimbaev: Director Central Asian Anti-Plague Research Institute City of Alma-Ata.
Both individuals were part of the epidemiological response team to the smallpox outbreak in Aralsk, Kazakhstan.
[lxxv] “OP#09,” 20.
[lxxvi] “OP#09,” 16.
[lxxvii] “OP#09,”
[lxxviii] Wendy Orent, “Escape from Moscow,” (The Sciences 1998), 31.
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This first appeared in The Havok Journal on September 13, 2021.
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Adam Bardaro served four years in the United States Marine Corps and five years in the California Army National Guard. He graduated with a BA in Social Science with honors. In 2020, he received his MA in History with a focus on World History and Genocide at CSU Sacramento.
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