In National Security Decision Memorandum 35, President Nixon addressed the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the CIA to end the biological weapons program. In the memorandum, the President directed to end all lethal and incapacitating methods of biological warfare. Additionally, the biological program was to be reduced to research and development for defensive purposes only.[l] By 1970, the policy extended to toxins developed either by biological process or be chemical synthesis.[li] The research and development program reduced to $10 million annually for defensive purposes. Thus, the directive altered offensive capabilities to defensive specializations for various departments. For example, the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infections at Frederick, Maryland specialized in medical research on diagnosis, therapy, and immunization. Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland conducted research and development for early warning and detection for biological weapons, including the destruction of multiple offensive biological weapons and munitions. Notably, lethal biological weapons on the destruction list included 220lbs of anthrax bacteria and 804lbs of rabbit fever bacteria.[lii] However, the Central Intelligence Agency did not follow the President’s directive and stockpiled biological weapons and toxins for offensive capabilities.
The Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the U.S. Senate Ninety-Fourth Congress revealed that the CIA disobeyed direct orders from President Nixon in the hearings between September 16th-18th, 1975. The investigation started from a whistleblower, a CIA officer, who provided information in April 1975 that Fort Detrick developed BW agents and “delivery systems suitable for clandestine use.”[liii] The information provided led to an investigation that uncovered that the CIA’s laboratory storage facilities had an inventory of eleven grams of shellfish toxin and eight milligrams of cobra venom.[liv] The Director of CIA, William Colby, testified that the shellfish toxins developed by the U.S. Army were developed for offensive use. These could be administered by using an electric dart gun to administer the poison from a cartridge equivalent to a .45 caliber pistol with an effective range up to one hundred meters. The Counsel to the Minority, Curtis Smothers, revealed that the toxin of eleven grams can kill “upward into hundreds of thousands.”[lv]
The most damning evidence provided was a memorandum from Deputy Director for Plans Thomas Karamessines to the Director of the CIA, received on February 16, 1970. The memorandum stated that the Special Operations Division at Fort Detrick maintained a specialized quantity of biological weapons that was omitted from the inventory list to be demilitarized and destroyed due to President Nixon’s order. In the list, it contained one hundred grams of anthrax and fifty grams of smallpox.[lvi] Furthermore, the memorandum states “If the Director wishes to continue this special capability, it is recommended that if the above DOD (Department of Defense) decision is made, the existing agency stockpile at SO Division, Ft. Detrick be transferred to the Huntington Research Center, Becton-Dickinson Company, Baltimore, Maryland.”[lvii] The evidence provided from the Congressional Hearing proved that the CIA disobeyed direct orders and stockpiled a comprehensive inventory of various biological weapons.
The U.S. biological weapons program contradicted the ongoing Smallpox Eradication Program and the efforts from the CDC with the WHO. While epidemiologists such as Dr. Henderson and Dr. Foege spearheaded the efforts to eradicate smallpox from endemic countries, the CIA stockpiled fifty grams of smallpox for offensive capabilities. Amid the U.S. and Soviet Union alliance to end smallpox, President Nixon pushed to cease the U.S. biological weapons program which was in direct opposition to the smallpox eradication program. However, the Cold War raged on in a clandestine manner conducted with disobedience by the CIA.
In the end, Cold War policies prevailed and undermined the efforts of the joint effort of the WHO to combat diseases such as smallpox. In response, when the Soviet Union learned of the US stockpiles, it competed to create biological weapons with offensive capabilities. Historically, the Soviet Union researched and developed BW for defense only. The CIA reported in 1964 that the intelligence could not find evidence of facilities exclusively for offensive biological weapons nor any evidence of field testing. In fact, the report states, “We believe that the Soviets have no present intention to employ BW in military operations… The USSR, however, will continue to develop defensive means consistent with its estimate of the Western BW threat, and to consider the offensive potential of BW.”[lviii] The Soviet Union monitored the U.S. BW program closely and eventually, the USSR decided to build BW for offensive reasons, creating a biological weapons race in the middle of their alliance to end smallpox.
In 1952, Professor V.D. Timakov had warned of the threat of the U.S. BW program and accused the U.S. of using biological weapons in the Korean War.[lix] While the transcript of Timakov’s article acquired by the CIA is labeled as “unevaluated information,” it still provides revealing content. For example, Timakov names Ft. Detrick accurately for its R&D of biological weapons. Timakov pushes Soviet Union propaganda, “In the name of humanity and peace, the peace-loving nations of the whole world, under the leadership of the USSR, will succeed in putting a stop to the evil deeds of American imperialists, and thus protect humanity from the threat of bacteriological warfare.”[lx] On the other hand, Timakov claims that the USSR microbiologists and scientists conduct research and development of biological agents for defense purposes such as vaccines for the bubonic plague. Additionally, he reports that Soviet scientists’ goals were only towards the prevention and eradication of infectious diseases.[lxi] While Timakov’s sentiments are full of USSR propaganda, he fairly represents the atmosphere of the Cold War and the Soviet Union’s view of the threat of the U.S. BW program.
Even by 1969, the study by the National Security Council PMG believed that the USSR would not deploy BW to initiate an attack as a primary means as a weapon of mass destruction.[lxii] Instead, the PMG reported that the Soviet Union, like the CIA, would use biological weapons in clandestine operations. The CIA gathered that the Soviet Union studied the common variety of infectious diseases as a means for public health and veterinary medicine.[lxiii] It also found that the Soviet Union was developing an aerogenic immunization method to disseminate antigens by aerosol in an enclosed area.
Nonetheless, the U.S. intelligence community believed that the USSR BW program focused on defense but had the potential for offensive capabilities. For example, the CIA was concerned by the Soviet Union’s extensive research on anthrax and the plague which may have had offensive applications.[lxiv] However, the CIA argued that these diseases were endemic in the USSR which explains the extensive research. Then by the 1970s, the CIA saw a shift in USSR policy and reported that the “Soviets allocated almost $2 billion on a program to overcome a perceived U.S. lead in CBW and provide a new generation of CBW weapons to be fielded in the next decade, and it appears that the Soviets have maintained and expanded their BW effort.”[lxv] While the period coincides with the CIA’s own clandestine R&D of offensive biological weapons, there is no direct evidence proving causation. This period, however, shows that the Soviet Union perceived the U.S. biological weapons program as a threat and decided to develop biological weapons capabilities both in defensive and offensive use.
© 2023 The Havok Journal
The Havok Journal welcomes re-posting of our original content as long as it is done in compliance with our Terms of Use.
