The Iraq War/Operation Iraqi Freedom – Lessons Learned

by Master Sergeant Tyrone D. Barrow, US Army

Throughout the early 2000s, the United States (U.S.) led an invasion of the Republic of Iraq. One intended outcome for the U.S. was to remove Saddam Hussein and his regime (the Baath Party) from power. Literary reviews of the Iraq War identify vital factors that led to strategic errors on behalf of the U.S., errors that would destabilize the country for decades. A thorough analysis of the strategic military planning during the invasion reflects severe flaws in the military decision making process (MDMP) (Department of the Army, 2015, p. 1-3).

One major flaw is the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) (Department of the Army, 2019a, p. 1-1). The IPB failed to dive deep enough into the political, social, and information considerations of PMISII-PT (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time) (Department of the Army, 2019b, p. 1-3). The De-Ba’athification policy, which derived from many strategic planning failures that happened at the highest levels within the Department of Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Army, directly contributed to the destabilization of Iraq. Military historians portray the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 as a victorious operation; however, the De-Ba’athification policy undertaken by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) led to the deterioration of the region’s stability.

Strategic Military Planning

The strategic military invasion plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was a brilliant display of U.S. military might. However, the plan also revealed a severe flaw in the U.S. military’s ability to plan against second and third-order effects of a successful counterinsurgency (COIN) operation (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018). The military planners primarily focused on the removal of Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. Before the invasion, the military planners conducted detailed intelligence gathering to assess Iraq’s military capabilities, infrastructure, terrain, and other considerations. The method of execution was to conduct a robust air campaign that would destroy Iraq’s military infrastructure, command centers, and other vital targets and a synchronized ground invasion, thus creating multiple fronts to overwhelm the Iraqi defenses. This two-pronged attack would secure the southern region and Baghdad altogether (Knights, 2004).

By all accounts, the military operation in Iraq was a success. It took U.S. forces 21 days from the beginning of the initial invasion to defeat Saddam’s Republican Guard and seize the Nation’s capital (Baghdad) (Laub et al., 2023). The victory would have been an ideal end state if one of the assumptions by the military planners during MDMP had come to fruition. The U.S. government believed that regime change in Iraq would contribute to regional stability and promote democracy. The contemporary thought in the U.S. was that regime change meant the removal of Saddam and the dissolution of his Baath Party (Pfiffner, 2010).

However, some military historians would argue that the U.S. won the war but lost the battle. Had the military planners done their due diligence during the IPB, they would have understood that the removal of Saddam was necessary but not the dissolution of his Baath Party. The Baath Party was not the head of the snake that needed to be severed to neutralize the snake. The Iraqi people had no interest in being westernized. Furthermore, the Sunni and Shiites have been at war since the inception of Iraq; the Baath Party was the only thing stopping the country from descending back into civil wars and chaos (Pfiffner, 2010). These significant factors must be identified during the IPB; hindsight would show that the military planners for this operation inadequately assessed some critical components of PMISII-PT during their IPB.  

IPB

The IPB incorporates critical information into the operation orders, such as the enemy’s likely courses of action, key terrain considerations, and potential threats. The IPB ensures that the friendly forces are well-prepared and can adequately respond to the challenges they might face on the battlefield (Department of the Army, 2019a). Before the invasion, U.S. intelligence personnel collected valuable information from various sources, such as human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and aerial reconnaissance.

As part of the analytical process, planners assessed the impact of the operational environment on friendly and enemy forces by analyzing the enemy’s doctrine, tactics, and capabilities, as well as PMISII-PT, to identify potential threats (Knights, 2004). IPB is a critical part of the MDMP (Department of the Army, 2019a). If the operational environment is misidentified or misrepresented in any way, it compromises the entire MDMP, which produces a cascading effect. The operation order is compromised, which compromises the operation plan and, in this case, can compromise policy. For this operation, the IPB needed to adequately assess the political, social, and information considerations of PMISII-PT.

 PMESII-PT

The IPB for this military operation may have considered PMISII-PT; however, based on a thorough literary review, the planners failed to adequately assess the political, social, and information considerations of PMISII-PT. A detailed assessment of all political considerations within Iraq before 2003 would have shown that the Baath Party could maintain a functioning government and retain control and stability within the country after the removal of Saddam. The Shiites, on the other hand, while eager to play a role in the political arena in Iraq, needed to possess the capability and know-how to achieve the reconstruction of a functioning Iraqi government.

A detailed assessment of all social considerations within Iraq prior to 2003 would have shown that most of the Iraqi population viewed the U.S. as an invading force and viewed the U.S. vision for democracy as a form of westernization of which they were not particularly big fans. A detailed assessment of all information considerations within Iraq before 2003 would have shown that most media, radio, and publishing information within Iraq at the time needed to tell a Western narrative. The information the Iraqi people received depicted Western ideology and way of life as being drastically contrary to their own (Pfiffner, 2010). Applying this vital information about the operational environment to MDMP would have changed some courses of action (COA) and improved the commander’s decision-making during order production (Department of the Army, 2019a).

Military Decision Making Process

Military commanders rely on the MDMP to make critical decisions that affect mission orders and Soldiers on the battlefield. A flawed MDMP compromises the mission and the Soldiers (Department of the Army, 2015).  The IPB for the OIF invasion plan did not include critical considerations like the Baath Party playing an essential role in the reconstruction of the Iraqi government; the ideological differences; the way the U.S. was viewed within Iraq after the invasion; the fear that the Iraqi people had of westernization and for the loss of their culture (Pfiffner, 2010).

Had those critical considerations been included in the IPB it would have been weighted more highly during the COA development step, and the military orders that came afterward would have reflected essential tasks or lines of effort that accounted for and reacted to them. Some examples would be the U.S. leveraging the Baath Party to support the government and prepare the country for open democratic elections. Additionally, the implementation of a robust information campaign countering the ideological difference between the east and the west prior to any significant muscle movement after Saddam was deposed.

These or comparable actions could have been embedded into the COAs and could have been part of the mission orders. In the military community, it is commonly accepted that COAs lead to operation orders, operation orders lead to operation plans, operation plans lead to operation executions, and operation executions sometimes lead to policies. In most cases, policies directly respond to actions; in the military, there are no actions without orders. Therefore, orders affect policy. The failure to identify vital information during the IPB resulted in inadequate military planning for this military operation. The inadequate military planning paved the way for the creation of the De-Ba’athification policy.  

The De-Ba’athification Policy

The De-Ba’athification policy was a byproduct of the inadequate military planning done by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the U.S. Army and is directly responsible for the deterioration of the region’s stability. This policy implemented by the CPA in 2003 resulted in the mass removal of experienced government officials, bureaucrats, and military personnel (Pfiffner, 2010). The policy led to a significant vacuum in state institutions, resulting inadequate governance apparatuses, administrative capacity, and stability.

As a result, the Iraqi government struggled to provide essential services and maintain law and order, leading to a power vacuum that various armed groups exploited. The Baath Party had a predominantly Sunni power base, and the policy disproportionately targeted Sunnis in critical positions, leaving them feeling marginalized and excluded from the political process. These anti-Sunni sentiments created a breeding ground for discontent. They provided an opportunity for Sunni insurgent groups, like al-Qaeda in Iraq, to recruit disgruntled former Baathists and other disenfranchised individuals, leading to the rise of insurgency and sectarian violence.

Removing experienced Baathist officials meant a loss of critical expertise and institutional memory necessary for the state’s effective functioning. The lack of experienced personnel hindered the rebuilding and restructuring efforts, leading to a further breakdown in public services, infrastructure, and governance. The De-Ba’athification policy deepened the divisions between Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic groups. The divisions intensified sectarian tensions and fueled violence between different factions, exacerbating the destabilization of Iraq, which ultimately led to a deterioration of the region’s stability (Pfiffner, 2010).

The Destabilization of Iraq

The power vacuum and weakened institutions in Iraq following the destabilization have fueled sectarian conflicts between the Shia majority and Sunni minority. This power vacuum has not only resulted in widespread violence within Iraq but has also spilled over into neighboring countries, especially Syria. The destabilization has created fertile ground for the rise of extremist groups, with the most prominent being ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria).

These groups have taken advantage of the power vacuum, sectarian tensions, and disenfranchisement of certain groups to gain influence and control territories. The deteriorating security situation in Iraq has led to a massive displacement of people within the country and has also contributed to a regional refugee crisis. Millions of Iraqis have become internally displaced, while many others have sought refuge in neighboring countries, placing significant strains on the host nations (Pfiffner, 2010). The Republic of Iraq has been in a constant state of chaos for over two decades as a direct result of the De-Ba’athification policy.

Conclusion

Military historians would discuss the 2003 Invasion of Iraq for many years to come. Many factors of Operation Iraqi Freedom could be debated and will always have varying points of view. However, one thing that will always remain a fact is that Iraq has been in a constant state of chaos for over two decades, and aside from being invaded, the country was stable prior to the De-Ba’athification policy (Pfiffner, 2010).

The De-Ba’athification policy, which derived from many strategic planning failures that occurred at the highest levels of the Department of Defense (DOD), including the U.S. Army was nothing short of a strategic error. The De-Ba’athification policy was the byproduct of inadequate military planning, as seen through a flawed MDMP and IPB, and is directly responsible for the current state of Iraq and the deterioration of the region’s stability. The lessons learned from the 2003 Iraq war OIF, will be used to teach future military strategist and leaders for years to come.

References

Cordesman, A. (2020). America’s failed strategy in the middle east: losing Iraq and the gulf.

Center for Strategic & International Studies [CSIS]. https://www.csis.org/analysis/americas-failed-strategy-middle-east-losing-iraq-and-gulf

Department of the Army. (2015). Army design methodology (ATP 5-0.1).

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/atp5_0x1.pdf

Department of the Army. (2019a). Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (ATP 2-01.3).

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN31379-ATP_2-01.3-001-WEB-4.pdf

Department of the Army. (2019b). Operations (ADP 3-0).

https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN18010-ADP_3-0-000-WEB-2.pdf

Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2018). Counterinsurgency (JP 3-24).

https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_24.pdf

Knights. M. (2004). Operation Iraqi freedom: one year on. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/operation-iraqi-freedom-one-year

Laub, Z. Lizarazo, K.& Sherlick, J (2023). A timeline of the Iraq war. Public Broadcasting Service [PBS]. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/a-timeline-of-the-iraq-war

Pfiffner, J. (2010). US blunders in Iraq: de-baathification and disbanding the Army.

Intelligence & National Security – Routledge. https://safe.menlosecurity.com/doc/docview/viewer/docNCAACB9F456BA69cde967c55fe4e721b99e0ed8b1f4aafc2cecf8dff7d685fa2e554b13b57cc4

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This first appeared in The Havok Journal on December 20, 2023.

Master Sergeant Tyrone D. Barrow began his military career on 27 April 2006, he was 27 when he joined the U.S. Army, from New York, NY. He attended Basic Combat Training at Fort Jackson, SC, he then attended Advanced Individualized Training at Fort Gregg Adams where he obtained the Military Occupational Specialty of 92G, Culinary Arts Specialist. Master Sergeant Barrow has served in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and at the time this article was written was a student at the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy Class 74 at Fort Bliss TX.

As the Voice of the Veteran Community, The Havok Journal seeks to publish a variety of perspectives on a number of sensitive subjects. Unless specifically noted otherwise, nothing we publish is an official point of view of The Havok Journal or any part of the U.S. government.