by Peter Clifton, Fire Direction Officer, U.S. Army
Author’s Note
This opinion piece is intended for those with a basic understanding of military operations and their interconnectedness, as well as mission execution through the warfighting functions. Additionally, it is admittedly geared towards fires soldiers; however, I firmly believe that this is important for all, especially our maneuver brothers and sisters, whom we ultimately support. They best comprehend actions to and on the objective, and their ability to convey such expertise will enable fires supporters to ensure we facilitate mission success in the most effective way possible. Lastly, this is not to disparage our HIMARS and MLRS brethren; rather, it is an expansion on caution that should be in every fires leader’s head: while we want to destroy everything via fires, we cannot, and therefore must organize and develop to best facilitate maneuver operations. A [smoke] screen can be more important than an ‘adjust fire’ or ‘fire for effect.’
HIMARS/MLRS differ from cannons in their capabilities and limitations significantly. Therefore, they should complement each other on the battlefield while supporting maneuver forces, instead of competing for funding and development at the expense of each other and maneuver needs. I welcome and encourage feedback of any kind. Please reference the bibliography for any supplementary information or resources. Obviously, these views are personal and do not necessarily reflect the position of the U.S. military, or the U.S. government.
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INTRODUCTION
It is no secret that deep fire(s) capability is critical. High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) and Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) units have seen great success in the Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Inherent Resolve conflicts and are fielded by many countries including Qatar, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates ((“High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS)”). Their retention as strategic assets, typically at the division level and higher, illustrates their importance and their battlefield success statistics are impressive. In 2019, the Army Modernization Strategy outlined “Strategic Fires, Precision Strike Missile(s), [and] Extended Range Cannon Artillery” for accelerated development. This effectively thrust forward Field Artillery as a critical component to be modernized in preparation for the next near peer threat, designated primarily as Russia and China by the Trump Administration’s December 2017 National Security Strategy and the Pentagon’s 2018 National Defense Strategy (National Defense Strategy Summary).
For the purposes of this opinion piece, a near peer threat/adversary will be understood as any opposing force(s) that have military capabilities similar to our own; they will be able to counter or out preform our weapons and defense systems, and prevent the U.S. military from having near absolute supremacy in almost every warfighting domain and warfighting function that we have possessed in the Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN) being conducted in the Middle East. While the U.S. has been primarily engaged with COIN operations for the last two decades, our adversaries have evolved their long range precision fires capabilities, especially Russia (Johnson and Shlapak); Russian heavy artillery currently outranges American artillery by roughly 15.5 kilometers, and fires a 203mm shell in comparison to the U.S. 155mm shell (Collins and Morgan). Therefore, the effort to modernize and extend our own fires capabilities is warranted and even more critical to counter our potential adversaries to ensure victory in potential upcoming conflicts.
POTENTIAL FRICTION
At the Field Artillery Basic Officers Leader Course (FABOLC), many senior officers briefed openly or alluded to the idea that deep fires are the way of the future as the cannon becomes obsolete against a near peer adversary, especially with the abundance of technological development present in 21st century warfare. While the Army Modernization Strategy has expanded research and development in cannon capabilities like the Enhanced Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) project, it is clear that pro-deep fires sentiment rests within senior artillery leaders across many echelons, made more prominent by branch modernization efforts like that of the U.S. Marine Corps, addressed later in this piece. Although I am a cannon officer and fully acknowledge possible bias, I disagree with this sentiment. I have identified three main friction points that will illustrate deep fires systems as incapable of supporting all necessary battlefield functions for fire support, thus preventing their replacement of cannon artillery. The three friction points are coordination issues, survivability implications, and aura.
COORDINATION
Coordination is the key to success on the battlefield. Without commonly understood commander’s intent, rehearsals, and a shared understanding of the mission, a plan soon disintegrates into chaos. As Prussian Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke summarized, no plan survives first contact with the enemy. However, the coordination required to utilize HIMARS and MLRS units is substantial, primarily because the units are strategic assets. HIMARS and MLRS fire support is tasked with providing “…the brigade, division, corps, Marine air ground task force, and joint commanders with a long-range strike capability” (ATP 3-09.60). Therefore, they deploy in support of division and corps level operations, while being seldomly pushed down to the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) echelon. Consequently, command authority is retained at no lower than the BCT echelon, meaning that no less than an O6 Colonel can clear their fires.
More often than not, the clearance for HIMARS and MLRS fires is retained even higher at the O7 General level and higher, to ensure that an operational theater headquarters is properly overseeing that expensive munitions are not wasted on targets better engaged by other cheaper and more responsive assets. Thus, HIMARS and MLRS are primarily utilized to support echelons concerned with the ‘big picture’ scope around an operational theater. They are of course additionally reserved for high priority targets among Special Operations Forces (SOF), who may use them to engage their important targets from compounds to individuals. If not at the aforementioned command levels, these platforms would never be pushed down to company or battalion fire support officers to implement in company and battalion operations. Their expensiveness also guarantees that they would never be utilized to engage a squad of enemy combatants in a field or a sniper in a building, the element size many COIN engagements fall under. Therefore, HIMARS/MLRS are unable to support the echelon of elements engaging in direct combat operations.
SURVIVABILITY
Deep fire platforms are fiercely guarded. There are several reasons for this: firstly, they are critical assets to friendly forces to ensure fires coverage over the depth of the battlefield. Secondly, they are expensive and fire expensive munitions. Thirdly, their capabilities and importance to friendly operations make them invaluable targets to the enemy. Therefore, we can conclude that they are simultaneously a high-value target (HVT) and a high payoff target (HPT) on the battlefield. If this alone did not make them highly sought after, they are also more susceptible to enemy counter fire because the “…launcher signature, noise, smoke, and fire make each firing position easily identifiable from great distances, especially in open terrain” (ATP 3-09.60). This combination of their importance, firing signature and their mechanics make their battlefield survivability difficult.
To ensure their survivability on the battlefield, their survivability operations dictate that they operate in vast areas. Their operations manual, titled “Techniques for Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) Operations,” prescribes that “…MLRS/HIMARS platoon position area should normally be large enough to allow a 3-by-4 kilometer operational area,” because “smaller areas severely restrict…the survivability of the platoon” (ATP 3-09.60). With that size of an operations area for one platoon-sized element of launchers, it must be noted that this will prove operationally difficult in an area such as the South China Sea, as islands may not be large enough to support a platoon’s survivability maneuvers along with other units if counter fire impacts.
Furthermore, the munitions have long minimum ranges. In a potential military conflict in the South China Sea, HIMARS and MLRS launchers would have a hard time being “…positioned close to the FLOT [Forward Line of Troops]” and would likely only be able to provide fires over the depth of the battlefield, inviting communication problems as sensor to shooter connectivity would be severely degraded (ATP 3-09.60).
AURA
The last friction point, and probably least quantifiable, is the aura of deep fires. Despite being largely elusive in the analytical approach, I believe the aura surrounding deep fires is quite real and contributes heavily to their allure, impacting the deep fires development race. Simply, civilians and some military leaders prefer the idea of technologically advanced missiles flying far through the air to ‘dumb’ artillery rounds impacting the battlespace. To bring a quantifiable concept to the table, I have tied in financial factors with aura as I believe that they are intertwined. The concept of new technology is linked with higher costs; however, just because something costs more, does not necessarily mean that it is better or more effective, a crucial point that is lost on many.
Therefore, financial implications will be under the broader umbrella of aura as those that it is lost on think that higher spending is a causation of higher performance equipment. This likely stems from the financial competition between the branches as it is at an all-time high. With all military branches continuously jockeying to be relevant in the fields with the most funding and “Shock and Awe” value, competition over systems and corresponding capabilities manifests greatly.
The Air Force has emerged as the leading military branch with the most expensive technological advances surrounding planes and drones, having a budget of 194.2 Billion Dollars in the 2019 fiscal year in comparison to the Army’s budget of 182 Billion Dollars and the Navy/Marine Corps’ combined budget of 194.1 billion dollars respectively (Defense Budget Overview). The creation of Space Force in December 2019 presents an entirely new branch to compete with for funding.
An example of aura and subsequent financial factors driving defense decisions instead of scrutinized development and analysis is when the Air Force began to replace the A-10 aircraft with the sleeker and stealthier F-35 platform. Lockheed Martin, partnering with senior Air Force leadership among other branches’ leadership, marketed the F-35 aircraft as an ‘all-in-one’ platform, capable of fulfilling bomber, close air support (CAS), and fighter roles. With this, they sought to kill the existing A-10 CAS platform, which had little upgrades since its fielding, aside from updated onboard hardware systems. Despite strong pushback from seasoned ground combat operations commanders, special operations personnel, and battle tested conventional ground combat veterans, the Air Force pressed forward. From the start, the F-35 program was riddled with setbacks, driving costs grossly over budget, and continuously increasing (Insinna).
When the Air Force finally had an aircraft ready enough to begin CAS trials alongside the A-10 to illustrate its proclaimed superiority, the tests went largely unpublicized; sources close to the trials released that “…not a single event includes ground troops, or any kind of fluid combat situation, which means these tests are hardly representative of the missions a close air support aircraft has to perform” (Grazier). Not only were the tests unpublicized for fear of an unfavorable outcome for the F-35, but they were also blatantly poor at actually measuring performance, as many factors were altered to give the F-35 the advantage, such as limiting the payload so that it was unrealistically light in comparison to a full combat loadout, and removing ground troops from the equations who are ultimately responsible for interacting with the aircraft for target acquisition and munitions guidance, not to mention passing ground situation updates (Grazier). Air Force leaders favored the replacement of the A-10 because they want the newest, shiniest object, and all the increased funding that comes with fielding the F-35, from pilot and maintainer training to parts procurement.
Akin to the F-35 versus A-10 situation, a likeness emerges in relation to developing future artillery capability. The new, shiny, technologically advanced F-35 in its current state fails to provide CAS to ground units with the same ability as the A-10, just as I fear the HIMARS/MLRS systems will fail in certain fire missions in comparison to cannon artillery. It would seem that for some, they are more concerned with the aura and financial implications of deep fires weapon systems than their actual utility to support their branch’s operations.
A high explosive artillery round, even with a guidance kit, is still incredibly cheaper than the missiles or rockets that MLRS and HIMARS shoot. Cannon artillery shells are also simply not as exhilarating to witness being fired or impacting, and their shorter range does not give senior leaders and soldiers alike the same feeling. Although speculative in nature, there clearly is valid concern regarding aura, and should absolutely be counted as a friction point because of the role it plays in the allure of deep fires to Army and Marine Corps leadership.
A DEVELOPING SITUATION
Although a recent development at the composition of this article, I would like to put forward my observations in an emerging case study of the artillery’s role in Marine Corps down-sizing that highlight my friction points. In October 2020, the Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger announced that the Marine Corps would be significantly downsizing and reorganizing the Marine Corps to better prepare for counter Chinese maritime operations in the South China Sea (Kenney). The Combat Development Command paralleled this, stating that the “…Marine Corps is redesigning the 2030 force for naval expeditionary warfare in actively contested spaces” (Kenney).
Pertaining to fires, we must note that Marine (cannon) artillery batteries will reduce to five down from the current twenty-one and that the “…Marine Corps is also planning to increase its long-range rocket Artillery abilities by 300%” (Kenney). By that steep percentage, we can clearly see that Marine Corps leadership is favoring the procurement of long-range precision fires over cannon fire support. Alas, has the Marine Corps also fallen into the allure of deep fires?
Imagine you are a young HIMARS platoon leader, tasked with supporting a Marine beach landing on one of the contested islands in the South China Sea. You are executing preplanned targets, and trying to service calls for fire through your fire direction center from the Marines and Navy, while simultaneously conducting ongoing survivability maneuvers around San Fernando, the Philippines. However, your scope widens significantly as radar stationed in Laoag, the Philippines, frantically transmits to you that they are picking up counter fire headed at you from Hainan, China.
You now have to decide between an immediate march order (leaving that position), or hunkering down if it is too late to move, and then countering said fire after the barrage impacts, if you are not already dead. Although hypothetical and simplified in many ways, this scenario reveals the complexity of operating such units in an expeditionary campaign. We will now relate our friction points of coordination and survivability to the hypothetical situation, and see why deep fires are not conducive to island campaigns.
Coordination would be an absolute nightmare. With radars, HIMARS and MLRS artillery, cannon artillery, Marine Corps light and light armored maneuver units, Naval and Marine Corps fixed wing and rotary aircraft and of course naval ships all operating within a relatively small area littered by islands and facing threats both from the land and the sea, an incredibly chaotic environment would develop.
The risk of fratricide would sky-rocket, and the lack of fire support to maneuver units would become evident quickly, likely at great cost to us. Commanders and battle tracking apparatus would fail to keep up with all Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs) as they evolve and units/aircraft maneuver through them. The enemy jamming and countering our communications networks would prevent vital information from getting to applicable units, likely leading to catastrophic results.
Relating to Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), not only would all FSCMs need to be adhered to but threats stemming from other islands that maintain overlapping threat rings interconnected around the islands would also need to be accounted for before employing any aircraft, further complicating coordination.
In order to utilize these assets in an operation, more re-transmitting stations would need to be set up on the islands and water alike to ensure communication flows between necessary parties, further complicating the coordination of implementing such deep fire capabilities. Across significant bodies of water and land, communications may not even work regardless of enemy counteraction, and certainly won’t work at 100% with enemy action. Thus, if communication is broken at any point in the chain, disastrous effects will be all too present.
Therefore, I argue that HIMARS and MLRS fire support would fail to support advancing Marines to the degree that cannon artillery could because their coordination would be convoluted, and would slow down their implementation to dangerously low fire mission processing, both for their fire support and own security. While I concede that Naval Gun Fire Support (NGFS) could hypothetically deliver some fire support to Marines advancing onto follow-on objectives in a naval expeditionary campaign, they will also be tied-up engaging targets directly threatening the ship, both from land and sea.
Thus, fire support to Marine maneuver units would be busy and unavailable for long durations during an operation, thereby failing to be readily available when targets of opportunity present themselves or units get into hard situations and need immediate suppression missions prosecuted to ensure their own survival. This becomes even more important with the abolishment of Marine heavy armor (tanks) and the future downsizing of armored platforms to carry heavier weapons systems in support of infantry (Kenney). Lastly, NGFS is not as accurate as cannon artillery, evident by the danger close ranges of 650 meters and 300 meters respectively. The coordination required to properly implement long-range fires in such a concentrated and dynamic fight would be impossible.
Survivability will prove more difficult; the small size of islands would make it near impossible for HIMARS and MLRS units to perform their survivability measures. Recalling the survivability maneuvers from above, a 4 square Kilometer island would not lend itself well to ensuring the HIMARS and MLRS units stay hidden and displace after fire missions, and could not house more than a platoon-sized element of 4 launchers. Furthermore, they would be easier to spot, as fires coming from one singular island surrounded by ocean quite clearly reveal what that island conceals, leaving the batteries vulnerable to counterattacks facilitated by well-trained enemy observers. This would effectively make the islands harboring HIMARS and MLRS units’ high-value targets to the enemy, jeopardizing the batteries and any other unit working on the island.
The long minimum ranges of HIMARS and MLRS would prevent them from supporting Marines assaulting a beach and advancing throughout an island unless the assault was conducted far enough away to meet the minimum range criteria. HIMARS and MLRS conducting targeting on the same island they are positioned on is unfeasible with how much space they need to have between themselves and the target in order to meet the minimum range criteria. The “…M39 Block I missile (ATACMS [Army TACtical Missile System] Block I) has a minimum range of 25 kilometers and a maximum range of 165 kilometers” (ATP 3-09.60).
This would prove difficult on small islands not meeting those minimum range criteria and would prevent HIMARS and MLRS from being located close to the FLOT as they prefer. Possibly, Marine HIMARS and MLRS units could still support Marine landings on a beach from a greater range on U.S. or friendly occupied land, such as from units based in Japan or neighboring islands in [closer] proximity to the objective(s); however, this fire support would only be useful for pre-planned targets, and fail to support the developing situation or any subsequent calls for fire as communication across islands would prove harder because it allows the enemy more opportunity to deny our communication networks across the battlespace as covered under coordination.
As HIMARS and MLRS units are high-value targets, they would be threatened across a greater range as the units are exposed to more than just the immediate operations of the Marine Corps beach landing or the specific island they are operating on. In turn, this would require more assets and integration for coordination and execution, and immensely complicate the targeting processes. HIMARS and MLRS would be responsible for conducting fire support and counter-fire operations across an incredibly vast area, while simultaneously processing and executing pre-planned targets in designated phases for a specific operation.
Simplifying the above, radar would have to monitor several areas across many islands from the actual Marine objective(s) to the enemy support zones in order to provide counter-fire data. HIMARS and MLRS units would be responsible for engaging targets at the Marine objective(s), and prosecuting counter-fire operations across many islands. This would negate the simplicity of only dealing with several islands at a time while using each successful capture as a launch point for the next island, as evident in the island hoping campaigns in World War II (Hickman). As survivability and coordination intertwine, they prove too complex to positively execute the multitude of missions that would be required in support of an operation with responsive mission processing.
If this all could be synchronized, that would not only be quite a feat but also enable our missions to be executed like finely tuned clockwork on a good day. However, in this example with many moving parts including joint coordination across branches, commands, ships, aircraft, maneuver elements, and fires assets, I doubt it is possible with our communications being disrupted and a near peer adversary countering our weapon systems across the operational environment such as the many islands within the South China Sea.
To make this already complex environment more convoluted, introducing international partners like Japan and the language barriers, command and control differences, and overall capability dissimilarity would further complicate the planning and execution of missions. While I firmly believe that partner training exercises improve our ability to work together and may even mitigate many of the potential issues arising from working with our allies, I think that specific coordination relating to fires would become even more problematic as the airspace becomes more congested with aircraft from allies, and more munitions flying through airspace from other country’s fire support assets.
Overall, I think that HIMARS and MLRS systems will be hard to employ to their full potential in maritime operations as the Marine Corps gears up for conflict in the South China Sea. Their coordination (primarily planning and execution) and survivability requirements for successful use will make them impossible to support maneuver operations in such a complex environment with such short ranges and rapidly developing situations. Cautiously, I liken them to a tank; I fully agree with Marine Corps leadership that tanks are not conducive to maritime operations and island campaigns due to their size and weight, range, maintenance, and survivability requirements, and the tight operational environments that islands induce, but neither are HIMARS and MLRS systems for the same reasons.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Despite the friction points and subsequent discussion, HIMARS and MLRS platforms are essential to our deep fires fight, and thus should continue to be developed and integrated into our warfighting abilities. They are consistently more accurate and have far greater range than cannon artillery. However, since we will never fully be able to guarantee that our communications systems and long-range precision fire apparatuses are immune to enemy counters, especially in the next near-peer fight, cannon artillery must remain and progress.
I identify three key advantages possessed by cannon artillery: sensor-to-shooter coordination, SEAD, and effective manual usage. Where HIMARS and MLRS assets have demonstrated coordination issues, cannon artillery can pick up the slack. The organic integration of an artillery battalion into the BCT gives the maneuver units within direct fire support. Under division artillery, fires assets can be pushed to units by battlefield commanders with a direct understanding of the battlefield situation. Coordination is easier as the field artillery battalion has a smaller area of operations to cover, and can assign batteries to further direct support maneuver battalions and companies depending on the mission and the assignments of each unit.
Thus, a unit in the “hot seat,” like going through a breach, can have assigned priority of fire and utilize those responsive fires to neutralize or destroy threats as the battle develops. Moreover, fire support officers and forward observers will have to compete for less as the assets are directly supporting their overall brigade, unlike HIMARS and MLRS units supporting division level operations, greatly slowing their responsiveness. With less competition, and no need to coordinate the fulfillment of requirements to pass down such a strategic asset to a lower echelon, fire supporters can maintain a better sensor-to-shooter connection with fewer obstacles to clear fires and bring timely destruction on target in support of maneuver forces.
Superficially, cannon artillery exudes little survivability on the battlefield, as towed artillery takes time to emplace and displace, which is a critical component in delivering timely and accurate fires and mitigating counter-fire effects. Thus, I fully agree that the future of artillery is self-propelled. However, self-propelled cannon improvements dispel any notion of cannons being obsolete. These advancements show the modernization of cannon artillery, ensuring its survival with self-prolusion, cementing the place for cannon artillery on the battlefield of tomorrow. The M109 Paladin, a tracked artillery piece, does an excellent job of providing 155mm cannon self-propelled fire support to armored units, and is continuously improving as it is currently on the M109A6 model. Despite this, some may argue that the M109 Paladin is unfit for some terrain and environments due to it being a tracked vehicle; they would be only partially correct.
To counter mobility issues posed by tracked systems while acknowledging the poor survivability of towed artillery cannons, the U.S. has begun development on self-propelled, wheeled artillery pieces. These relatively recent developments come in the form of the new Hawkeye and Brutus experimental systems currently undergoing development (South). The Hawkeye system is essentially a 105mm cannon on a HUMVEE chassis, and the Brutus system is essentially a 155mm cannon on FMTV chassis (South). Whether or not the U.S. is behind in self-propelled cannon development is debatable. Several countries like France and Japan have developed wheeled self-propulsion for 155mm cannon artillery.
France currently fields the CAESAR 155mm howitzer, and Japan fields the Type 19 155mm howitzer, with 6×6 and 8×8 wheel drive respectively (The 10 Most Effective Self Propelled Artillery”, “Japanese Army Unveils Its New Type 19 155mm 8×8 Wheeled Self-Propelled Howitzer”). Although French CAESAR batteries have seen combat action in the Middle East, and the system has been out of experimental status for many years unlike the American Hawkeye and Brutus systems, I am inclined to agree that the U.S. is catching up to current friendly capabilities. More importantly, I do not think that this is a security concern for the U.S. yet, as our development shows promising progress in the right direction. As long as the United States fields a tested, complete product, and has time to train artillerymen and women on these new systems before the next near peer war, I believe that we will succeed on the next battlefield with these new tools.
Furthermore, I firmly believe that cannon artillery has a future in SEAD. Not only are they already integrated to SEAD mission templates, but they will become even more critical in the next near peer fight. Although possible to establish a maximum height for HIMARS and MLRS delivered ordinance, utilizing them to suppress an enemy anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) system is wasteful and impractical. HIMARS and MLRS are not designed to suppress, but rather to destroy.
This would change the mission type to [search and] destroy instead of SEAD. With the coordination issues discussed earlier and the implacability of using such a deep fires system to suppress enemy AAA, the responsiveness necessary to conduct a SEAD would be lost; if a CAS or army attack aviation mission was being conducted and an enemy AAA piece popped up on the battlefield, responsive and suppressive fires would be required immediately, those of which a HIMARS/MLRS platform are simply not equipped to handle. In order to develop this cannon capability further, the current artillery targeting system known as AFATDS[1] would need to be able to [better] process SEAD missions, enabling execution at great speed to ensure the security of the aircraft.
Moreover, the ability to continue operating cannon artillery manually may prove to be one of the paramount skills in the next near peer fight. An abundance of technology from hacking capabilities to jamming devices to electromagnetic pulse weapons are prevalent on today’s battlefield; their development will make them key weapons for our adversaries to combat our own advanced technologies. For example, Russia has invested heavily in AAA to combat our dominating airpower. Both Russia and China continue to develop jamming devices to paralyze our communications infrastructure.
These counters illustrate a crucial need to return to the basics. Victory will belong to the side that is least affected by the loss of their digital infrastructure; the side that is not crutched by a reliance on technology and digitally aided weapon systems. When our adversaries attack our targeting systems, the ability of the artilleryman and woman to conduct manual gunnery in support of maneuver elements will decide the battle. Therefore, the manual ability of gun crews to engage targets is an advantage of cannon artillery over HIMARS and MLRS systems and should be leveraged with ERCA development to keep fires on our objectives. Manual gunnery knowledge and drills should be increased to ensure that our artillery is prepared for systems to go down, and can easily continue to deliver accurate and timely fires.
For those that argue that HIMARS and MLRS systems are more accurate, I will agree that they are over longer ranges. However, for the aforementioned reasons regarding the failure of digital systems on the modern battlefield, their accuracy can and will be largely negated. HIMARS and MLRS systems are more prone to “miss precisely.” For instance, if a target is not mensurated properly, made more probable by malfunctioning systems due to enemy interference, these long-range precision fires will not be so precise.
Mensuration refers to the process of determining the absolute latitude, longitude, and elevation of a [target] location, to ensure that its data is precisely known and can therefore be input into targeting systems. When our mensuration capabilities are attacked, these systems will accurately hit their input data if the whole system is not corrupted, but will still not be precise in hitting the desired target. This disadvantage is less prevalent in manual gunnery for cannon artillery.
Additionally, artillery shell accuracy has also improved contemporarily with smart rounds such as Excalibur[2]. This is essentially a guidance kit for a 155mm shell and improves the accuracy of the artillery shell by guiding it to the input target location via GPS[3]. This is helpful in correcting for any computational errors or sudden changes in the situation, like the wrong meteorically data being input or a sudden burst of wind. If the five requirements for accurate fire are being met,[4] then cannon artillery will be comparatively accurate to HIMARS and MLRS systems without enemy interference.
This will achieve the desired effects on a target at an incredibly reduced cost, in addition to demonstrating the benefits of sensor to shooter coordination and manual computation. To enable the requirements to be met, precision registrations should continue to be conducted, and meteorological information gathering teams should be brought back to provide the FDC and gun line with the most accurate, current data possible. These steps will again ensure that manual gunnery for our artillery is accurate, and will ultimately enable us to consistently place desired effects on target.
In regards to perceived Marine Corps fire support issues, I propose NGFS development. It is largely impossible to add more 5-inch guns to the existing Arleigh-Burke class destroyer and the Ticonderoga class cruisers without compromising the ships’ basic structural integrity and other mission sets, so another route must be taken. Subsequently, I suggest three possible directions to take NGFS, or a combination thereof. The first possibility is to revamp frigate hulls for fire support execution. However, this is admittedly costly and similar to compromising the ships’ structural integrity, akin to repurposing the above class ships.
Another possibility would be to bring back “gun boats.” These smaller vessels could come in close to shore, and even ground themselves to support the advance off the beach. They could be outfitted with 80mm or 120mm mortars, delivering the smallest yet most “close in” means of fires support. This would also solve the issue that the Marine Corps will face of having less vehicles to mount heavier weapons on. Lastly, and likely the most feasible, would be to repurpose transport/cargo ship hulls like that of the Lewis and Clark class cargo ships. With the least modification in comparison to redesigning destroyers and frigates, these ships could be outfitted with several 5-inch guns or various howitzers, allowing the vessel to process multiple fire missions simultaneously.
Regardless of the route taken, listed or not, I believe that it is time for an altogether new class of fire support ship, designed specifically and solely to sit off shore and engage targets called for by attacking Marines. Finally, I disagree with downsizing Marine artillery units, and suggest instead retraining or standing up 105mm Howitzer elements, as well as creating more mortar sections. This size weapon system will allow more maneuverability with the advancing Marines, enabling them to bring their fire support along their island campaign.
THE FUTURE
Overall, I believe that the allure of deep fires are clouding the judgement of senior leadership. Like that of the F-35 project, HIMARS/MLRS will not be able to provide better fire support to maneuver units than cannon batteries can. Deep fire capability development should absolutely be continued, but their failure to quickly engage targets of opportunity, slow deviation from pre-planned fires, and their lack of connection between sensor and shooter, make them less equipped to provide timely, direct fire support to maneuver battalions on an ever changing battlefield. We must heed the dangers of technological disruption capabilities that our enemies have been developing and implementing in their own conflicts.
Furthermore, we must proceed cautiously with our own private defense firms, as the newest, shiniest ‘tech’ does not necessarily have the correct capabilities to provide fire support to maneuver units in lieu of cannon batteries, regardless of funds associated with the differing projects. The Marine Corps should follow suit; Marine leadership should contribute resources to supporting their maneuver elements with other means of delivering fire support such as the aforementioned ideas, or other alternatives. As Russian artillery currently outranges our own, their military doctrine also assigns maneuver units a supporting role to their artillery, contrary to our own doctrine of artillery supporting maneuver. Therefore, we must continue development of cannon capabilities to meet the artillery threat of our adversaries, both system capability and their implementation through doctrine.
Cannon artillery simply out preforms HIMARS and MLRS in the realms of sensor to shooter coordination, SEAD, and effective manual use. Their simpler connection to the maneuver units they support increases their response time by bypassing the many obstacles that plague the firing process of HIMARS and MLRS. Cannon batteries are better suited for suppression missions, especially SEAD, as their increased responsiveness allows quicker suppression of enemy AAA, providing safety for the pilots and friendly aircraft. Of course, each artillery round fired is severely cheaper than those of HIMARS and MLRS, yet still similarly accurate with highly trained units meeting the 5 requirements for accurate fire under stressful combat situations.
Lastly, cannon artillery is unmatched in the ability to deliver accurate fires with degraded systems, as manual operation can be just as deadly with trained crews as automated systems are. When our systems are degraded, manual gunnery will rule the battlefield, especially when shooting the “25 meter target,” meaning engaging the immediate threats to combat operations instead of targets deep in the rear of enemy battlespace. The ability to put accurate artillery on target with degraded systems will likely decide the next near peer conflict. It is time to ensure that our basic skills as artillery men and women are sharper than our enemy’s, keep our cannon units updated and well trained, and finally, to dominantly re-establish our reputation as the ultimate king of battle.
Works Cited
“The 10 Most Effective Self Propelled Artillery.” Army Technology, 20 Feb. 2019, www.army-technology.com/features/featurethe-10-most-effective-self-propelled-artillery-4180888/.
Collins, Liam, and Harrison Morgan. “King of Battle: Russia Breaks Out The Big Guns.” Association of the United States Army, 22 Jan. 2019, www.ausa.org/articles/king-battle-russia-breaks-out-big-guns.
Grazier, Dan. “The F-35 vs. A-10 Warthog Face-off Is a Total Sham. Here’s Why.” The National Interest, 12 July 2018, nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/f-35-vs-10-warthog-face-total-sham-heres-why-25551.
Hickman, Kennedy. “Pacific Island Hopping in World War II.” ThoughtCo, Feb. 11, 2020, thoughtco.com/world-war-ii-across-the-pacific-2361460.
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[1] Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
[2] M982 Excalibur: extended ranger guided artillery shell
[3] Global Positioning System
[4] (1) Accurate Target Location and Size, (2) Accurate Firing Unit Location, (3) Accurate Weapon and Ammunition Information, (4) Accurate Meteorological Information, (5) Accurate Computational Procedures
This first appeared in The Havok Journal on December 14, 2020.
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