Convert Offshore Support Vessels into Cutters

Editor’s note: Citation superscripts have been removed to align with The Havok Journal’s formatting. Full references remain listed at the end.

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Pumps can keep a sinking ship afloat for only so long

U.S. shipbuilding is not only lagging behind the rest of the world, but also behind the goals it set for itself in bidding on new contracts. The lessons learned in the Integrated Deepwater System Program seem to have been forgotten 13 years later. That is tragic, since it was a boondoggle of a program that failed to thrive despite the inflated budgets of the Global War on Terror. In the end, it left the service with fewer surface assets than it started with when the program was initially conceived.

Now, over a decade after Deepwater officially lost authorization, the Coast Guard’s new Heritage-class cutters are four years late. The 11th National Security Cutter has been cancelled. The Polar Security Cutters are $2 billion over budget. Congress is debating an additional $14.6 billion in funding for shipbuilding in general. All while the world’s “premier lifesaving and maritime law enforcement organization” is cannibalizing its active fleet assets through a practice called Controlled Parts Exchange.

To rephrase that last line: They are pulling parts off cutters that are fully crewed and in service to give to other cutters which are also in service, just to keep the second one mission capable. This is akin to swapping parts between cars when you get home from night shift so your roommate can go to work during the day. Admiral Lunday, the current acting Commandant of the Coast Guard, referred to this practice as a “downward death spiral.”

The pump is working, but the ship is still going down. This raises the question: how desperate is the fleet maintenance situation that they have resorted to doing this?

To be blunt, it’s bad. The average age of the 210′ Medium Endurance Cutter (MEC) fleet is 56 years, and the 270′ cutter average is 36 years. Both classes of vessel were only designed to be used for 30 years. The ocean is a harsh and unforgiving environment, and Coast Guard cutters are known for sailing into some of the worst of it. The boats take a beating, and sometimes the systems they use are no longer manufactured, supported, or the company that made them no longer exists and no one bothered to license the patents.

If age wasn’t a big enough problem, there are still ongoing issues with the fleet’s new National Security Cutters (NSC). Everything from propulsion issues to structural failures to major military contractors knowingly selling defective parts. The stern-mounted small boat launch and recovery system on the NSC has been particularly embarrassing. Not only did the initial and replacement davit systems not perform as advertised, the recovery system on one of the NSCs got a service member killed. The incident prompted the member’s mother to write a book on the matter titled Troubled Waters: The Legacy of USCG Hero BM3 Travis R. Obendorf ~ OBIE (ISBN-13 978-0578821917).

So, it comes as no surprise that the Offshore Patrol Cutter program has ground to a halt after launching only one hull, behind schedule and over budget. While some of the delays were due to hurricanes, COVID-19, and labor shortages, many more were because of “technology development” delays, change orders, and simple compatibility checks like equipment being too big for the space it was to be installed in.

At some point a taxpayer must wonder what, exactly, they are being billed for.

In the end, cutter and boat crews are left to try and complete their missions with degraded assets, readiness, and capabilities. While this might be par for the course in the austere environment of forward operating bases in combat zones, the Coast Guard is working in the nation’s proverbial backyard.

What does a lifeboat look like to an entire military branch?

It may look like a civilian asset that can be modified for the mission. There is a long and storied history of using civilian designs for military roles. In the last hundred years alone, trucks, aircraft, and boats initially designed for the civilian sector became iconic from their wartime roles.

For example, during World War II British Q-Ships, merchant freighters with hidden anti-ship cannons, were credited with sinking 14 German U-boats and damaging 60 more. The Douglas DC-3 was a 1930s-era airliner that was converted to the C-47, which did everything from haul cargo, to drop paratroopers, to tow assault gliders. In Vietnam it became the earliest version of the close air support platforms that paved the way for the AC-130 Spectre gunships. During the Falklands War a pair of container vessels were converted to vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) support ships for helicopters and Harrier jump jets.

The U.S. Navy currently uses four Platform Supply Vessels (PSV), a general-use type of Offshore Support Vessel (OSV), as submarine escorts when they transit to and from their bases. The vessels started life as Hornbeck Offshore PSVs working the Gulf oil fields before being converted into armed and armored bullet sponges for one side of the nation’s nuclear triad. Most recently, the U.S. Navy has tested a pair of Large Unmanned Surface Vessels that started life as civilian Fast Supply Vessels, a faster type of OSV that prioritizes speed over cargo capacity.

With firm examples to draw inspiration from, selecting the appropriate hull from an existing catalog should be done with the MEC mission set at the top of the requirements list.

What are the Medium Endurance Cutter missions?

Officially the four missions of the MEC fleet are Homeland Security, Law Enforcement, Alien Migrant Interdiction Ops, and Search and Rescue. These terms are umbrellas for more specific tasking like counter-drug ops, fisheries enforcement, counterterrorism, counter–human trafficking, environmental protection, harbor defense, and related work. They conduct these missions on patrols that last anywhere from 45 to 90 days, though extensions past that are not unheard of.

To accomplish these missions, they need three things: a VTOL-capable flight deck for helicopters, the ability to launch and recover small boats, and a vessel large enough to do both. Modern OSVs can already do these things, and some are built to do so in North Sea conditions, giving them greater durability than most military standards.

What does this mean from a technical standpoint?

The two areas of technical concern are OSV capabilities and mission hardware. The Coast Guard can conduct its missions from just about anything that floats; having a purpose-built platform just makes it easier. Below is a short list of the capabilities that an OSV should already have or be able to accommodate with minor modifications:

Performance Characteristics

• Cruise speed of 16 knots (18.5 mph), max of 20 knots (23 mph)
• DP2 equipped (dynamic positioning)
• 5,000 to 7,000 nautical mile range (engine and genset dependent)
• 50,000 gallons diesel storage
• 2,500 to 5,000 gallons JP-5 fuel storage

Installed Equipment

• Two main diesel engines, or comparable diesel-electric drive system
• Two main diesel generators with tertiary backup diesel generator
• Shipboard firefighting system
  • Two installed firefighting pumps
  • Fire mains throughout the interior and exterior of the vessel on all decks
  • Fire plugs at key points on the fire mains
  • AFFF in-line proportioning system
  • Flight deck remote firefighting nozzles and fire plugs
• Installed dewatering system for flooding

Crew Accommodations

• Galley
  • Capable of feeding 50 to 75 crew three times a day plus “mid-rats”
  • Refrigerated and freezer stores for food for thirty days without rationing
• Fresh water plant and storage
• Blackwater (sewage) tanks and marine sanitation device for 50 to 75 crew
• Gray water plant and storage
• Berthing spaces for 50 to 75 beds (can be added during conversion)
  • 6-man rooms for enlisted crew
  • 2-man rooms for junior officers and chiefs
  • 1-man suites for CO, XO, LTs (3 to 4 depending on configuration)
• Bathroom, shower, laundry facilities
• Recreational areas
  • Gym large enough to accommodate 15% of the crew at a time
  • Lounge areas for E-6 and below; the mess deck does not count as a recreation area, it is a working space.

Additional requirements (preferred, not required in a civilian hull; can be added)

• Helipad flight deck for VTOL operations
• HALON, CO₂, or misting firefighting systems parallel to the fire mains
• Machine shop with room for stock material
• Two dedicated, fully equipped damage control lockers
• Dedicated cargo space for spare parts, portable equipment, and general stores
• General-use cargo spaces for unforeseen future needs

Where possible, all hardware should be rack- or skid-mounted to make component replacement relatively easy and straightforward. Bolt patches in the decks for major equipment changeouts will speed repair and refit time.

The length, beam (width), and draft (keel depth) of the OSV will vary depending on how requirements are met. It will likely be between 200′ and 275′ long with a beam of 45′ to 60′. Draft will be determined by the type of OSV hull selected. Given the nature of the Coast Guard’s mission, a shallow hull is recommended.

Where mission hardware is concerned, many of the mission requirements have already been met via existing commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) systems; installing the military hardware comes down to integration. It is important to note that system integration can be every bit as complex as starting with a “clean sheet” build. However, if done right it can save time and money.

The savings stem from the fact that the major system capabilities and metrics are hard facts, published in sales brochures and maintenance manuals, as opposed to nebulous, yet-to-be-determined variables. That was one of the major issues with the NSC and OPC programs: engineers were trying to design around technology that wasn’t mature. Refitting civilian designs with proven, compatible hardware largely avoids that problem.

In terms of weapons and sensors, most military systems can be fit into standard 20′ and 40′ shipping containers. One example is the stern Mk 38 Mod II 25 mm cannons on the U.S. Navy submarine escorts. The weapons platforms are mounted on top of a 20′ container with their control and power systems housed elsewhere. There are several vendors that offer “containerized” C4ISR rooms, as well as other mission-specific solutions ranging from armories, to brigs, to bunk rooms. Many of these systems have been perfected in the logistics crucible of the GWOT. Modularity for rapid repair and replacement should be given high priority when sourcing components and vendors.

Lastly, redundancy in hardware is almost a cultural mandate in the military. Every system aboard the OSV should have secondary and tertiary backups. Equally important is that the redundant systems be from the same product line as the primary. This will reduce the logistical burden of supporting multiple product lines and reduce the amount of storage space needed for spare parts. Equally important, if there are different systems that perform similar functions, they need to be cross-compatible.

Compressed air, for example, has multiple uses on a ship. There are installed ship-service compressed air lines for tools, compressed start-air for the main diesel engines, and high-pressure air for refilling firefighting SCBA air packs. That’s three different compressed air systems, all operating at different pressures. The smarter option is to have three compressors that operate at the highest required pressure, and step down the supplied air to meet different needs. Similar to the way main power is supplied at 440 V throughout the ship, then stepped down via transformers as needed.

Mission scope, creep, and duration

With any new platform, the temptation is to cram as many capabilities as possible into it, but at some point, limits must be acknowledged. More importantly, they need to be established from the outset. This is an interim solution, designed to provide a means to phase out the legacy 210′ and 270′ MEC fleet while the OPC program is established.

Scope

The overarching goal, or maybe philosophy, is for the OSV fleet to be outfitted to directly step into the role of legacy MECs without major changes to strategy and doctrine. This philosophy goes all the way down to equipment and system details. Where possible, the same make and model of systems currently in use aboard MEC hulls should be used aboard the OSV. If the equipment in question is no longer manufactured and there are no spares in inventory, then the same model specified for the OPC hulls should be installed in the interim fleet for continuity.

This does two things. First, it utilizes existing product support lines and accounts already established with the Coast Guard. It also makes use of existing spare parts inventories (where possible). Second, it reduces the need for retraining. For example, the diesel genset used aboard 270′ MECs is the Cat 3412. Since the MK rate (machinery technicians) is already familiar with that model, it makes sense to install them on the OSV. The same goes for other systems like the air compressors mentioned above, or firefighting pumps, or radar arrays. This works for forward compatibility and training as well, if OPC-standard systems are selected instead of legacy hardware.

Creep

Keeping the installed systems as close to Coast Guard standard has the added effect of checking mission creep. A MEC is not going to make a drug interdiction, then steam at 35 knots across its operations area to make another one in 12 hours. The MECs are the slow, methodical pursuit predator of the Coast Guard. The OSV interim cutters should be deployed with the same mindset: staged well ahead of their targets to wait.

Duration

As stated, the OSV interim fleet is a temporary solution. In keeping with the lifeboat analogy, it’s not meant to be kept in use for the next 60 years. When the OPC fleet is finally online and the last of the legacy 270′ MECs have been retired, the OSV hulls can start the decommissioning and phaseout process.

This is where the last advantage of the OSV comes in. Foreign militaries and coast guards like to buy old U.S. hardware. The proven OSV hulls can be sold as-is to those countries or stripped of their mission hardware and sold as blank slates for use in their original roles in the civilian sector.

Implementation: crawl, walk, jog

A solid plan is a great reference point for change. It keeps your goals in focus, a running tab on available resources, and gives decision makers the flexibility they need to achieve the mission. In short, the end is more important than the means. Setting hard goals and sticking to them will be essential to the plan. A project as large as refitting 8 to 10 hulls will need to be implemented in phases.

Phase 1: Crawl
In addition to the bare minimum requirements listed above, program managers will need to do a deep dive on the 210 and 270 fleet to refine their search for an existing OSV hull. A goal of a 75% to 80% match on existing capabilities will reduce the refit time without excluding too many viable options in search of the perfect fit. Perfection is the enemy of progress.

While research is being done, planners need to start the proposal process to find available ship refit yards and expertise to complete the work. Swiftships, the company that converted the FSV to the Large Unmanned Surface Vessel, would be a good starting point. Given past experiences with the major defense contractors, priority should be given to smaller, more nimble companies. Focus should be on refit and not new construction firms, with smaller, short-duration contracts at fixed prices.

When a hull type is selected, two or three should be acquired for refit in parallel. This will allow for economy of scale and make the project more palatable to refit yards. One of the primary goals is for this program to be a refit only, not a structural redesign of the selected vessel. Equipment installation should be done in such a way that refit yards can make changes easily; sea trials will reveal problems that are not visible dockside.

When the hulls are launched for sea trials, having multiple vessels will let crews and refit teams pool their knowledge as they iron out any wrinkles. Putting the crews and the refitted hulls through a Tailored Ship’s Training Availability (TSTA) evaluation will identify many, if not most, issues that need to be resolved before the next round of purchase and refits. TSTA is a grueling three-week battery of drills and working knowledge tests designed to ensure a U.S. military ship is seaworthy and mission ready. The drills largely focus on damage control procedures and worst-case scenarios ships are most likely to encounter on mission.

Phase 2: Walk
At the end of Phase 1 and start of Phase 2, interim cutters will deploy alongside legacy cutters for final evaluation and lessons learned. During this period the conversion package will be standardized with line-item costs and budgets. “Wish and gripe” lists from Phase 1 crews will be evaluated before implementing the changes to the final packages. The Phase 1 crews will also be building out the training manuals and publications for the oncoming personnel. Again, good over perfect is the goal.

As legacy cutters are decommissioned, their crews will rotate through duty on the interim cutter fleet for training and familiarization while additional hulls are acquired for conversion. There should be no new systems or hardware that require time-consuming pipeline training, which is often needed for newly reporting personnel on the NSC.

Phase 3: Jog
The final phase is as much a bridge as it is a fully operational program. With an anticipated service life of at least ten years, there will be enough time to further refine the conversion package. The interim cutters will remain active through the decommissioning of the legacy MEC fleet and only start the transition out of service when enough of the OPC hulls come online.

Beyond the planned end of the program, it may be advantageous to keep several interim cutters in service as backup assets for when an NSC or OPC must go in for extended dockside or dry dock intervals. Additionally, they can act as force multipliers during surge operations where more small boats and VTOL deck space are a higher priority than cutter speed. Eastern Pacific counter-drug patrols have some unique requirements in that the cutters must offload detainees and contraband before entering a foreign port. Interim cutters can act as mule and brig boats to give cutter crews needed relief without pulling a second patrol asset from their op-area.

Plan ahead, tap existing resources, call on institutional expertise

When it comes to implementation, getting the design right at the start saves time and trouble in later stages. That means deep research and talking to subject matter experts. In all three phases, the end users—the service members who will be using and repairing the systems—need to be consulted. The importance of research and planning cannot be stressed enough.

The decision makers, program managers, and design engineers need to be shaking hands and having lunch with the enlisted personnel who will be manning the ship. They will be the ones to spot design flaws first. The same goes for the pilots who will be landing on the flight decks, and the junior officers manning the operations centers, bridge, and engine control room. The senior officers present should at a minimum be Cuttermen with at least three tours afloat, one of them as commanding officer.

There is no substitute for experience on the water, for living aboard a cutter for years at a time. The encyclopedic knowledge a 2nd class petty officer develops on their first tour afloat is enough to inform design decisions. Simple things like where to place a cut-off or overboard discharge valve so it can be quickly accessed, or how to mount a dryer so it can be quickly removed in case it catches fire, won’t occur to designers who’ve never served aboard a cutter.

The end users at every level must be a part of the design conversations, at every step. Period.

Addressing criticism early

It’s not a real warship.
The first and most predictable argument is that a modified civilian support vessel isn’t a military asset. The immediate rebuttal is to point out the U.S. Navy is currently testing a pair of unmanned surface ships that started life as FSVs, and the four converted OSVs that provide escorts for ballistic missile submarines. Never mind the number of current U.S. Army aircraft that are heavily modified civilian models, or the MARAD and Military Sealift Command fleets.

Buying a new cutter will be cheaper.
A brief review of the NSC and OPC programs with a focus on budgets is usually enough to make program managers change the topic. Furthermore, the cost of planned and emergency maintenance periods in dry docks for the legacy MEC fleet is a growing sore point with district commands. In 2016 the cost for paint for a 210′ MEC on the West Coast was about $2.2 million. That is in addition to dry dock rental time, labor, structural repairs, cleaning, environmental impact fees, etc. All these costs are on top of the time the asset and crew aren’t out on patrol.

With proper planning, hull selection, and staging, the conversion interval for the first hulls should take less than a year. Once the conversion package is standardized that time can be shortened even further, especially with commercial refit yards that have fixed-price experience. Much of the work can be done in parallel.

It’s not a permanent solution.
That’s the point. This is a bridge to get from where the service is today to where it wants to be in ten years. The rapid conversion and deployment of the interim cutters will give the shipbuilding industry time to iron out the wrinkles with the OPC program. Additionally, it provides operational flexibility as newer cutters come online.

Functional and effective outperforms “new and improved”

The U.S. Coast Guard needs to replace its aging fleet now. The mission needs do not go away while politics and bureaucracies bog down procurement. We have civilian assets with performance characteristics that closely match the existing MEC fleet. By their nature, OSVs are designed to be modified to fit the job at hand. They are proven and reliable.

The OPC may be purpose-built for the Coast Guard’s missions with the newest hardware available, but while the program takes ten years or more to mature our existing hulls are swapping parts between patrols. While American shipbuilding takes yet another generation to meet demands, Coast Guard mission capability degrades further.

That degradation leads to a greater burden on personnel who take up the slack where equipment has failed. When a shipmate burns out from mission load, it’s a greater drain on the service than a blown generator or ruptured pump seal. If they don’t separate from the Coast Guard entirely, their performance suffers, which is sometimes worse than losing them altogether.

The U.S. has a long and successful history of adapting civilian hardware to military needs. It is time to take the lessons learned from the previous century and apply them to the needs of the current one. Leadership needs to ask itself what is more critical: executing the missions with working tools or waiting for the new ones to come online?

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References

1. Heritage-class cutter – Wikipedia. Retrieved 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heritage-class_cutter
2. USNI News. “Ingalls, Coast Guard Scrap 11th National Security Cutter Over Contract Impasse, Says HII.” June 5, 2025.
3. USNI News. “GAO: Polar Security Cutter Design Won’t Complete Until 2024, Delivery of First Hull Estimated in 2028.” August 3, 2023.
4. USNI News. “Reconciliation Bill Calls for $14.6B in Coast Guard Cutters, New Arctic Icebreakers.” April 30, 2025.
5. USNI News. “Ingalls, Coast Guard Scrap 11th National Security Cutter Over Contract Impasse, Says HII.” June 5, 2025. Quote from Acting Commandant Adm. Kevin Lunday.
6. Naval News. “U.S. Coast Guard Provides Information on the Offshore Patrol Cutter.” January 15, 2022.
7. Heritage-class cutter – Wikipedia. Expected delivery end of 2026.
8. CBS News. “The Troubled Waters Of ‘Deepwater’.” August 17, 2015.
9. U.S. Coast Guard Year in Review | Proceedings – March 2025.
10. Wärtsilä Encyclopedia. “Offshore Support Vessels (OSVs).”
11. Integrated Deepwater System Program – Wikipedia.
12. Platform supply vessel – Wikipedia.
13. Offshore Engineering. “PSV – Platform Supply Vessel – Conceptual Design.” October 12, 2021.
14. Aud, K.C. “Solving America’s Boat Building Crisis | If It’s Stupid and Works, Then It Isn’t Stupid.” Havok Journal, November 1, 2024.
15. Island-class patrol boat – Wikipedia.
16. Maritime Force Protection Unit operations at Kings Bay.
17. Beam. “Power Your Offshore Projects with Advanced Vessel Technology.” April 8, 2025.
18. Wärtsilä Encyclopedia. OSVs designed for North Sea operations.
19. NauticExpo. “Offshore support vessel – All boating and marine industry manufacturers.”
20. Naval News. “U.S. Coast Guard Provides Information on the Offshore Patrol Cutter.”
21. Naval Technology. “Heritage-Class Offshore Patrol Cutters” – Electronics suite.
22. Platform supply vessel – Wikipedia. Crew accommodations.
23. Naval News. OPC mission equipment specifications.
24. Offshore Engineering. PSV typical service speeds.
25. Naval News. OPC range specifications.
26. Platform supply vessel – Wikipedia. Endurance capabilities.
27. U.S. Coast Guard. “Cutters.”
28. Naval News. OPC drug interdiction capabilities.
29. U.S. Coast Guard Year in Review | Proceedings – March 2025. SAR statistics.
30. Naval Technology. Heritage-class defense operations.
31. Naval News. Fisheries enforcement missions.
32. GAO reports on OPC design and construction challenges.
33. Heritage-class vs. NSC helicopter capacity comparison.
34. Legend-class cutter – Wikipedia. Military operations capabilities.
35. Offshore industry surplus OSV availability.
36. Swiftships. “Commercial Platform Conversion.” June 6, 2024.
37. GAO best practices for ship acquisition.
38. Implementation phase planning.
39. Standardized conversion package development.
40. Coast Guard training procedures.
41. Operational deployment priorities.
42. Bridge strategy implementation.
43. Lessons learned application.
44. Fleet transition planning.
45. WWII Liberty ship precedent.
46. GAO cost control recommendations.
47. Interim capability concept.
48. GAO design maturation recommendations.
49. GAO acquisition reform recommendations.
50. GAO cost and schedule performance data.
51. Coast Guard acquisition management.
52. Congressional funding initiatives.
53. Commercial conversion capabilities.
54. U.S. Naval Institute. “Warship Weapons on Merchant Ship Platforms.” Proceedings, February 2025.

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K.C. Aud has made a career of being lucky and has managed to find something positive in nearly every poor decision he’s ever made, even if it was only a new perspective on how not to do something.

Enlisting in the U.S. Coast Guard in 2010 he became an Operations Specialist (radio and navigation) and did his first tour in Georgia guarding submarines from drunk fishermen. In 2014, tired of the heat and the bugs he transferred to a 210-foot medium endurance cutter in Washington state. The cutter then regularly deployed to the hot and buggy west coast of Central America to hunt down drug runners. Aboard USCGC Active he traveled 94,194 miles and personally handled enough cocaine to keep a small country high for a decade. Somewhere in there, he learned to write, if not spell.  

Three years later, daunted by the prospect of spending the rest of his career in a windowless command center, he separated from active duty. After 13 different jobs ranging from beer brewer to dairy farmhand, to machinist, to Navy civilian contractor, he reenlisted in 2020 as a Coast Guard reservist, changing rates to Maritime Law Enforcement Specialist. When not helping the Navy assets in the Puget Sound troubleshoot radios, he’s on drill in Seattle doing water cop stuff and or flailing away at his keyboard. Though married and now a father, he misses the mission. 

As the Voice of the Veteran Community, The Havok Journal seeks to publish a variety of perspectives on a number of sensitive subjects. Unless specifically noted otherwise, nothing we publish is an official point of view of The Havok Journal or any part of the U.S. government.