The Hidden Erosion of USAF Readiness

Introduction

Have you ever been to an airshow, watched USAF aircraft perform, and thought, “Wow! What a capable aircraft! We have an amazingly powerful Air Force!” While we do have a great and powerful air component, did you know that the aircraft you’re watching might not even be able to perform its full intended mission?

The USAF Thunderbirds are the top example of this. Their jets have had many combat-related systems removed or deactivated for various reasons. Yes, they can be reconfigured for combat with some time and effort, but as they sit today, they can’t dogfight or drop ordnance.

A few days ago, I was watching a 1952 movie called Invasion USA. The premise was that the U.S. military had fallen behind in readiness, and as a result, an unnamed nation (clearly meant to be Communist Russia) struck the first blow. It was typical 1950s atom-bomb schlock, but it ended with a quote from George Washington. In his fifth annual message to Congress—the 1793 State of the Union Address—he said:

“If we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.”

That movie and Washington’s words inspired this article and the central question: Is our Air Force ready for war? Most Americans probably have no clue, and even many Air Force members outside of Operations and Aircraft Maintenance remain in the dark. What follows is a look at USAF aircraft mission readiness over the past 25 years.

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Mission Readiness: What “Mission-Capable” Really Means

Mission readiness—often measured as the mission-capable (MC) rate—is the Air Force’s day-to-day yardstick for how much combat power is truly available. In simple terms, the MC rate is the percentage of time an aircraft can fly and perform at least one of its assigned missions.

Closely related, the full mission-capable (FMC) rate measures whether an aircraft can perform all assigned missions. The Air Force also tracks categories like Not Mission Capable for Maintenance (NMCM) and Not Mission Capable for Supply (NMCS) to understand why aircraft are down.

An aircraft is counted as mission-capable if it’s able to fly and perform at least one tasked role—e.g., an F-16 that can fly air-to-air combat even if its suppression-of-enemy-air-defenses (SEAD) pod is down. If it can do every tasked role, it is full mission-capable. These definitions matter because averages can conceal critical nuance: a platform can look “available” yet still be limited due to shortages in sensors, pods, or low-density/high-demand components. The Air Force and GAO use these definitions consistently when publishing comparisons across the fleet.

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The 25-Year Trend at a Glance

2005–2012: During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the fleet sustained heavy use. Availability varied by community, with legacy fleets often outperforming boutique fifth-generation types due to parts commonality and mature supply chains. GAO and CBO analyses noted a gradual softening of availability as aircraft aged and depot backlogs grew.

2013–2018: By 2018, the overall MC rate dipped below 70 percent, continuing a multi-year slide. Fleet age averaged around 28 years, despite the introduction of newer aircraft like the F-35A. Ironically, some “new” platforms like the F-22 and early F-35s posted lower readiness than older A-10s and F-15Es.

2019–2021: Defense Secretary Jim Mattis’s push to hit 80 percent readiness for selected fighters by the end of 2019 never materialized. GAO found that only four of 49 aircraft met their annual MC goals in a majority of the years studied. Service-wide averages hovered around the low 70s: 72.7% in FY2020 and 71.5% in FY2021. Fighter-specific MC rates bottomed at ~51% in 2021.

2022–2024: Aggregate numbers dropped further each year: 71.24% (FY2022) → 69.92% (FY2023) → 67.15% (FY2024)—the lowest in at least two decades. This decline was driven by specific platform struggles, notably the CV-22 Osprey (falling from ~51% MC in 2021 to 30% in 2024) and a modest slide in the A-10 from 72% (2021) to the mid-60s by 2024.

Bottom line: Two and a half decades of wear, slower replacement, depot and supply constraints, and modern system complexity have pushed average availability from the low/mid-70s toward the mid-60s, even as demand remains high.

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By Mission Community

Fighters
Fighter MC rates were hit hardest. The F-22, plagued by complexity and the closure of its production line, hovered around the 50s. The F-35A, though improving in capability, consistently missed readiness goals due to parts and depot limitations. Legacy fighters like the F-15E and A-10 often outperformed in availability, underscoring the maintainability of older types. In 2021, fighter MC was ~50.8%—a low point.

Mobility (Airlift)
The C-17 Globemaster III, despite being relatively young, struggled to meet MC goals across 2011–2019 due to heavy use and subsystem issues. Still, mobility fleets generally maintained better availability than fighters thanks to stronger supply chains and maintenance experience.

Special Operations & Tiltrotor
The CV-22 Osprey illustrates how engineering issues can devastate readiness. Chronic drivetrain and clutch issues, mishaps, and repeated groundings drove MC rates from ~51% (2021) to ~30% (2024).

Tankers
Legacy KC-135s continue to shoulder the load with mature sustainment systems. The KC-46 is phasing in, with early deficiencies (e.g., Remote Vision System) impacting operations. Its long-term contribution depends on how quickly upgrades and sustainment scale.

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Why the Slide? Five Root Causes

1. Age and Obsolescence – Average fleet age is now 30+ years, with some over 50. Older airframes need more inspections and harder-to-find parts.
2. Depot Capacity & Backlogs – Complex upgrades create “iron mountains” as aircraft await parts and modifications.
3. Supply Chain Volatility – Low-density components and single suppliers create bottlenecks that drag down MC rates.
4. Workforce Shortfalls – Recruiting and retaining maintainers and depot specialists has become increasingly difficult.
5. Operational Tempo & Groundings – High-demand fleets and safety stand-downs depress availability for months at a time.

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What’s Been Tried

• 80% MC Goal (2018–2019): Unattainable long-term, but it spurred short-term improvements.
• Condition-Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+): Data-driven predictive maintenance aims to reduce downtime, but execution hinges on data quality.
• Additive Manufacturing: 3D-printed parts reduce delays but require rigorous certification.
• Divest-to-Invest: Retiring older fighters to fund next-gen systems increases pressure in the short term.
• Agile Combat Employment (ACE): Designed for dispersed operations, but it complicates sustainment.

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Platform Snapshots

• F-22 Raptor: MC rates in the low 50s due to complexity and sustainment challenges.
• F-35A Lightning II: Persistent gaps in readiness despite rising capability.
• A-10C Warthog: Reliable availability—72% in 2021, easing into the high-60s by 2024.
• CV-22 Osprey: A steep drop to ~30% MC in FY2024.
• C-17 Globemaster III: Availability tied closely to depot and parts cycles.

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Putting Numbers Side-by-Side (2005–2024)

• Mid-2000s: Availability pressures during deployments; many fleets still relatively young.
• 2018: MC dips below 70%.
• 2020: 72.7% overall.
• 2021: 71.5% overall; fighter MC at ~50.8%.
• 2022: 71.24% overall.
• 2023: 69.92% overall.
• 2024: 67.15% overall—the lowest in decades.

GAO’s review (2011–2021) showed only 4 of 49 aircraft types met their annual MC goal in most years.

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Why “Average MC” Isn’t the Whole Story

1. Mission Mix: MC rates don’t capture FMC shortfalls.
2. Density & Surgeability: Fewer high-MC tails can be more useful than more low-MC ones.
3. Safety & Groundings: Stand-downs protect lives but depress metrics.
4. Availability vs. Lethality: A modern F-35 sortie may deliver more effect than multiple legacy sorties.

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What Would Bend the Curve Back Up?

• Data-Driven Sustainment (CBM+): Standardized, accessible data is key.
• Depot Throughput: Stable funding and predictable configurations reduce bottlenecks.
• Supply Base Resilience: Dual sourcing, additive manufacturing, and pre-buys help.
• Invest in Maintainers: Training, retention, and clearance reforms are critical.
• ACE with Sustainment Reality: Ensure dispersed ops have parts and people.
• Stabilize Fleet Mix: Fewer types and greater commonality boost efficiency.

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The Next Five Years

A dramatic rebound is unlikely. Instead, gradual improvement may come through predictive maintenance and depot reforms. Expect:

• FY2025–2026: Will the 2024 nadir (67.15%) stabilize or improve?
• Fifth-Gen KPIs: Watch depot turn times, parts fill rates, and FMC levels for sensors/weapons.

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Conclusion

Over 25 years, USAF aircraft mission readiness has declined from the low/mid-70s to the mid-60s. This is not the fault of a single aircraft or policy but the cumulative result of aging fleets, depot bottlenecks, fragile supply chains, workforce pressures, and stand-downs.

The good news: solutions like CBM+, additive manufacturing, depot investment, and smarter fleet management exist and are underway. If leadership pairs sustained investment with modernization, the USAF can bend the curve upward again—perhaps not to 80 percent, but back into the 70s with stronger effective combat power.

One final note from this old maintainer: if you give the mechanics the parts, training, manpower, tools, authority, and expertise they need, MC rates could climb into the 80s. Unfortunately, bureaucracy too often stands in the way.

So, are we ready for war? That depends on the kind of war you mean. The safest answer is: no, we aren’t.