by Sergeant Major Daniel L. Dodds

The Korean War began when North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950, capturing the majority of South Korea, excluding a small part of the country around the city of Pusan (Tonder, 2018). South Korea had support from the United States and United Nations Command (UNC), while North Korea had support from Russia and China (Tonder, 2018). After a swift response from General (GEN) MacArthur, American and allied troops from the UNC pushed the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) north of the 38th parallel, capturing the North Korean capital of Pyongyang and continuing to the Yalu River, which bordered China (Bill of Rights Institute, n.d.).

Despite rhetoric from the Chinese foreign minister that China would intervene if allied troops marched north of the 38th parallel, GEN MacArthur intended to unify the peninsula under the South Korean government. He disregarded the warnings and ordered the Marines to march north (Bill of Rights Institute, n.d.). The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir using the principles of mission command, elements of command and control, and the command and control warfighting function, which enabled the fighting withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division from the Chosin Reservoir despite being at a disadvantage against a much larger Chinese Communist Force (CCF).

Principles of Mission Command

According to the Department of the Army [DA] (2019), mission command is “the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision-making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation” (p. 15). There are seven principles of mission command—competence, mutual trust, shared understanding, commander’s intent, mission orders, disciplined initiative, and risk acceptance—which help lead forces against an unknown enemy by empowering subordinates (DA, 2019).

A culture of mutual trust and shared understanding between commanders, staffs, and subordinates is necessary for mission command to be effective (DA, 2019). Mission command creates an environment where subordinates and intermediate leaders exploit opportunities to counter threats from hostile forces while remaining true to the commander’s intent. Instead of focusing on the specifics of how to conduct every mission, senior commanders issue mission orders that give subordinates the freedom to complete tasks in ways appropriate to the circumstances on the ground. Importantly, shared understanding of the purpose and end state assists with exercising disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent (DA, 2019).

Shared Understanding and Commander’s Intent

The Army defines shared understanding as the mutual understanding of the operational environment, the purpose of the operation, and the criteria for solving problems within the operation (DA, 2019). Shared understanding encompasses the flow of information from the national strategic level down to the tactical level where small units and crew actions occur (DA, 2022).

Commanders and their staff use mission and fragmentary orders to translate plans into direct actions to meet their higher commander’s intent (DA, 2022). At the operational level, the purpose was destroying the NKPA (Blair, 1987). For Major General (MG) Smith and the 1st Marine Division, the purpose was to push north to the Yalu River along the northeastern region near the Taebaek Mountains (Bill of Rights Institute, n.d.). The Marine Reconnaissance Company received mission orders “to screen the Division’s left flank by occupying specified objectives” in the vicinity of Hagaru-ri (Montross & Canzona, 1957, p. 22). Through receipt of mission orders and commander’s intent, commanders at each level understood the operational environment, purpose, and end state, resulting in shared understanding and a foundation for subordinates to exercise disciplined initiative.

Disciplined Initiative

Disciplined initiative is the duty “subordinates have to exercise initiative within the constraints of the commander’s intent to achieve the desired end state” (DA, 2019, p. 24). During disciplined initiative, superiors count on subordinates to take action and make sound decisions in support of the commander’s intent rather than awaiting further instructions.

During the Battle of Chosin Reservoir, two key instances of disciplined initiative occurred within the 1st Marine Division. First, while marching north, MG Smith understood the importance of establishing a stronghold and ordered his men to secure Hagaru-ri, build an airstrip and supply depot to aid resupply, and control the only road leading to the Yalu River (Bill of Rights Institute, n.d.). The second instance occurred when the CCF bombarded Hagaru-ri. Lieutenant Colonel Beall and Major Tighe staggered through the outpost line to find cooks, mechanics, and drivers to reinforce the perimeter without orders (Hammel, 1990; Bill of Rights Institute, n.d.). Through disciplined initiative, the Marines successfully held off the offensive, defended vital territory, and made it possible to command and control the operational environment.

Elements of Command and Control

Army Doctrine Publication 6-0 defines command and control as the exercise of authority and direction over assigned and attached subordinates to achieve a task (DA, 2019). Commanders cannot supervise every action within their units simultaneously, hence the distributed nature of command and control. The elements of command are authority, responsibility, decision-making, and leadership (DA, 2019). However, these actions will fail without the elements of control: direction, feedback, information, and communication (DA, 2019). Inherent in command authority, commanders must communicate when making decisions and directing forces into battle.

Elements of Command: Decision Making

During combat operations, the ability to make decisions promptly can result in success or failure. Decision-making involves selecting the best course of action based on mission variables and adapting when those actions are no longer feasible (DA, 2019).

An example is when MG Smith “lost no time putting into effect his preparations for trouble in the shape of a formidable CCF attack” (Montross & Canzona, 1957, p. 135). Aware of the encirclement of the Marines west of the reservoir and under constant artillery strikes, the establishment of blocking positions and the airstrip at Hagaru-ri formed a vital link for equipment resupply and casualty evacuation (Bill of Rights Institute, n.d.).

With Army forces east of the reservoir decimated, MG Smith decided to execute a fighting withdrawal to the southeast coast at the port of Hungnam (Cowart, 1992). According to Cowart (1992), GEN Song Shi-lun, the Chinese 9th Army Group Commander, bypassed the Marines at Yudam-ni for the attack at Hagaru-ri. His chances of success would have been much greater had he stuck to his original plan, but the Marines’ preparations spoiled his attack. Through prompt decision-making and communication, MG Smith directed the 1st and 7th Marine Infantry Regiments to execute the fighting withdrawal to the Hungnam Beachhead.

Elements of Control: Direction and Communication

Commanders use communication to direct the actions of subordinates in accomplishing missions (DA, 2019). When directing forces, it is essential to elaborate on the purpose and end state to ensure unity of effort (DA, 2019). Clear and concise communication fosters shared understanding. Analyzing information and subordinate feedback provides commanders with the ability to visualize the operational environment and make necessary adjustments.

Together, these actions reinforce the principles of mission command and the elements of command and control. When GEN MacArthur directed MG Smith to march north, MG Smith opposed the decision and voiced his concerns. However, when MG Smith communicated the importance of Hagaru-ri to Colonel Litzenberg, he defined the concept of operations, making it easier for further orders to reach subordinate units. The engineer company began building the airstrip, while Fox and Easy Companies fortified the Toktong Pass and Hill 1282 by digging foxholes and preparing to fight the CCF (Bill of Rights Institute, n.d.).

Command and Control Warfighting Function

A commander’s ability to succeed during battle is highly dependent on the command and control warfighting function (DA, 2019). This function includes tasks and systems that enable the synchronization and convergence of combat power (DA, 2019). While the commander is the focal point of their organization, all leaders play an integral role in conveying their higher commander’s intent to subordinates, which drives the operations process (DA, 2022).

Command and Control Tasks: Drive the Operations Process

Commanders lead and assess forces during the operations process by visualizing, understanding, describing, and directing (DA, 2019). According to DA (2019), command and control tasks include commanding forces, controlling operations, driving the operations process, and setting up command and control systems.

MG Smith’s approach was sound when directing the withdrawal at the Chosin Reservoir. Despite having an inadequate strategic plan from GEN MacArthur, MG Smith quickly assessed the situation on the ground during the CCF attack and eventual withdrawal. He used his experience to coordinate airstrikes from Marine Corsairs, artillery barrages, and cargo plane drops of medical supplies, ammunition, and radio batteries (Bill of Rights Institute, n.d.). The network of command and control systems assisted with successfully executing the Marine withdrawal.

Command and Control Systems: Command Posts and People

Army Doctrine Publication 6-0 defines command and control systems as “the arrangement of people, processes, networks, and command posts that enable commanders to conduct operations” (DA, 2019, p. 32). These systems help commanders make decisions, notify subordinates of those decisions, and command forces toward a common goal (DA, 2019).

MG Smith selected Hagaru-ri as the location for his forward command post and controlled the battle of the Chosin Reservoir from that location (Bill of Rights Institute, n.d.). He directed Marine infantry soldiers 14 miles northwest to occupy Hill 1282 to cover the retreat (Bill of Rights Institute, n.d.). He ordered Fox Company Marines to deploy in a horseshoe perimeter to protect the hill and provide overwatch for the road (Bill of Rights Institute, n.d.). MG Smith’s command post and the Marines of the 1st Marine Division killed and injured more than 42,000 CCF soldiers, rendering the Chinese 9th Army Group ineffective and enabling the fighting withdrawal over 80 kilometers from Hagaru-ri to Hungnam Beachhead (Bill of Rights Institute, n.d.; Cowart, 1992).

Conclusion

The purpose of this essay was to analyze the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir using the principles of mission command, the elements of command and control, and the command and control warfighting function, which enabled the fighting withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division despite fighting a much larger CCF.

Through shared understanding and disciplined initiative, MG Smith established a stronghold at Hagaru-ri while marching his Marines north to the Yalu River. When overwhelmed by the CCF attack, he shifted focus by directing his forces, analyzing information, applying judgment to feedback, and making prompt decisions. Through the principles of mission command and elements of command and control, he was able to drive the operations process from his command post to the Marines on the ground. The Battle of Chosin Reservoir culminated in a successful withdrawal at the Hungnam Beachhead and a decimated Chinese 9th Army Group.

References

Bill of Rights Institute. (n.d.). The Korean War and the Battle of Chosin Reservoir. Bill of Rights Institute. https://billofrightsinstitute.org/essays/the-korean-war-and-the-battle-of-chosin-reservoir

Blair, C. (1987). The forgotten war: America in Korea, 1950–1953. Times Books.

Cowart, G. C. (1992). Miracle in Korea: The evacuation of X Corps from the Hungnam beachhead. University of South Carolina Press.

Department of the Army. (2019). Mission command: Command and control of Army forces (ADP 6-0). U.S. Government Publishing Office. https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=1007502

Department of the Army. (2022). Operations (FM 3-0). U.S. Government Publishing Office. https://armypubs.army.mil/ProductMaps/PubForm/Details.aspx?PUB_ID=1025593

Hammel, E. (1990). Chosin: Heroic ordeal of the Korean War. Presidio Press.

Montross, L., & Canzona, N. A. (1957). The Chosin Reservoir campaign: United States Marine operations in Korea, 1950–1953. U.S. Government Printing Office.

Tonder, G. (2018). North Korea invades the South: Across the 38th parallel, June 1950. Pen and Sword.

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Sergeant Major Daniel L. Dodds is a Military Police Senior Noncommissioned Officer. He has served in every leadership position from patrolman to battalion command sergeant major. He is currently assigned as the Director of Operations Sergeant Major for the United States Disciplinary Barracks, the only Level III maximum-security prison in the Department of Defense. His civilian education includes an associate degree from Excelsior University and a Bachelor of Arts in Leadership and Workforce Development from the Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). He is currently pursuing a Master of Public Administration from Excelsior University.

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