Bellum Omnium Contra Omnes: The Permanent Logic of Human Conflict

“Bellum omnium contra omnes.”

The phrase is most commonly translated from Latin as “the war of all against all.” It originates from the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, particularly his 1651 work Leviathan, where Hobbes described the condition of humanity absent political authority as one of perpetual insecurity and violent competition.

For Hobbes, the “state of nature” was not necessarily constant physical combat. Rather, it was the condition in which violence remained perpetually possible because no higher authority existed capable of enforcing order. In such a world, trust becomes fragile, fear becomes rational, and survival itself becomes the primary organizing principle of political life.

Hobbes’ description remains one of the most enduring—and uncomfortable—observations ever made about human affairs because it continues to describe not only individuals, but the international system itself.

Modern civilization often assumes it has transcended the brutal logic of earlier centuries. International institutions, economic interdependence, globalization, and technological advancement are frequently presented as evidence that humanity has evolved beyond primitive power politics.

Yet beneath the language of diplomacy and cooperation, the international order still operates according to a fundamentally Hobbesian structure.

There is no global sovereign.

No world government possesses a monopoly on force capable of reliably enforcing peace between nations. International law exists largely through voluntary compliance. Alliances persist only while interests align. Treaties endure only so long as states believe honoring them remains preferable to violating them.

At the international level, humanity still exists in a condition remarkably close to Hobbes’ state of nature.

This is the central insight of realism in international relations theory.

Realism begins from an intentionally unsentimental assumption: states operate primarily according to self-interest within an anarchic international system. “Anarchy” in this context does not mean chaos. It means the absence of overarching authority. Every state ultimately remains responsible for its own survival because no external power can guarantee its security permanently.

This reality shapes everything else.

Realists argue that moral aspirations, ideological commitments, and international norms matter only insofar as they align with national interest and power. States may speak the language of universal values, but when survival or strategic advantage is threatened, power calculations dominate rhetoric with remarkable speed.

History repeatedly validates this observation.

Nations routinely invoke principles selectively. International law is often enforced unevenly. Human rights concerns fluctuate according to geopolitical convenience. Alliances form and dissolve not through sentiment, but through changing strategic necessity. Even close allies quietly compete economically, technologically, and politically beneath the surface of formal cooperation.

This does not mean morality is irrelevant in international politics. It means morality operates within the constraints imposed by power.

Realism is frequently criticized as cynical or pessimistic. In reality, realism is less an ideology than a recognition of recurring patterns in human behavior and state interaction. Realists do not necessarily celebrate conflict; they simply observe that conflict emerges naturally in systems lacking centralized authority.

The twentieth century offers overwhelming evidence supporting this view.

Europe entered the First World War deeply interconnected economically and culturally. Many intellectuals believed industrialization and commerce had made major war irrational. Norman Angell famously argued in The Great Illusion that modern economies had become too interdependent for large-scale conflict to remain viable.

Then millions died in the trenches.

The same pattern repeated after the Cold War. Liberal theorists predicted globalization, democratic expansion, and economic integration would gradually dissolve traditional geopolitical rivalry. Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis suggested ideological evolution had largely resolved the major contradictions driving conflict.

Then came renewed great-power competition, terrorism, cyber warfare, proxy wars, and the return of large-scale conventional conflict in Europe.

The lesson is difficult but consistent: technological progress changes the character of competition without eliminating competition itself.

This is why bellum omnium contra omnes remains relevant centuries after Hobbes wrote it.

The phrase describes something permanent about systems composed of actors pursuing survival under conditions of uncertainty. Individuals behave this way under lawless conditions. Tribes behave this way absent stabilizing authority. States behave this way within the international system.

And increasingly, modern geopolitical realities suggest the world is returning to a more explicitly Hobbesian era.

The post-Cold War unipolar moment created the illusion that liberal international order had become permanent. American military dominance, economic globalization, and relative stability allowed many Western societies to assume major power conflict belonged largely to history.

That assumption is eroding rapidly.

China seeks regional and potentially global influence commensurate with its growing economic and military power. Russia has openly challenged the European security order through force. Iran continues expanding asymmetric influence across the Middle East. Non-state actors exploit technological democratization to wield disproportionate power. Cyber conflict increasingly blurs the line between war and peace.

Meanwhile, international institutions appear progressively weaker at constraining major powers when core interests are involved.

This does not represent a collapse of the international system so much as a reversion to its underlying reality.

Realists would argue the temporary stability of the post-Cold War period obscured—not eliminated—the enduring logic of power politics. Once relative power balances began shifting again, competition predictably intensified.

Military professionals understand this instinctively because strategy requires confronting reality rather than preference.

The military profession cannot afford utopian assumptions about human nature or international behavior. Strategic planning depends upon recognizing that intentions change, alliances shift, and adversaries pursue their own interests regardless of moral language or diplomatic optimism.

This does not make cooperation impossible. In fact, realism often produces more durable cooperation precisely because it grounds expectations in actual incentives rather than idealistic abstractions. Stable alliances typically emerge not from universal goodwill, but from mutual strategic benefit.

NATO, for example, functions not because states suddenly transcended self-interest, but because collective defense aligns with the interests of its members.

Realism does not reject peace. It simply argues peace is maintained through deterrence, balance of power, and credible strength rather than assumptions about universal harmony.

The future implications of this are profound.

First, the coming decades will likely involve intensified competition between major powers across multiple domains simultaneously: military, economic, technological, informational, and cultural. The distinction between war and peace may continue eroding into what some strategists describe as “persistent competition.”

Second, smaller states will increasingly face pressure to navigate rival power blocs carefully. Multipolar systems historically create instability because rising and declining powers frequently miscalculate one another’s intentions.

Third, domestic political fragmentation within democratic societies may become a major strategic vulnerability. Realists have long recognized that external power depends heavily upon internal cohesion. A divided society struggles to sustain long-term strategic focus.

Finally, technological advancement may amplify Hobbesian dynamics rather than resolve them.

Artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons, cyber capabilities, biotechnology, and information warfare all lower barriers to disruption while increasing uncertainty. In systems defined by uncertainty, fear and mistrust naturally intensify. States accelerate arms development not necessarily because they desire conflict, but because they fear falling behind adversaries who may not share their restraint.

This is the classic “security dilemma” central to realist thought: actions taken defensively by one state are often interpreted offensively by others, triggering escalating cycles of competition.

In many ways, modern civilization remains trapped within the same logic Hobbes described centuries ago.

Humanity possesses extraordinary technological sophistication, yet political organization still rests fundamentally upon coercive power and strategic calculation. The veneer of order remains real, but fragile. Beneath it persists the ancient reality Hobbes identified: absent enforceable authority, actors compete because survival demands it.

Bellum omnium contra omnes is not merely a historical phrase.

It is the permanent shadow behind international politics.

The challenge for modern civilization is not pretending that shadow no longer exists. The challenge is managing it without allowing it to consume the future entirely.

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Charles served over 27 years in the US Army, which included seven combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan with various Special Operations Forces units and two stints as an instructor at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He also completed operational tours in Egypt, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea and earned a Doctor of Business Administration from Temple University as well as a Master of Arts in International Relations from Yale University. He is the owner of The Havok Journal, and the views expressed herein are his own and do not reflect those of the US Government or any other person or entity.

As the Voice of the Veteran Community, The Havok Journal seeks to publish a variety of perspectives on a number of sensitive subjects. Unless specifically noted otherwise, nothing we publish is an official point of view of The Havok Journal or any part of the U.S. government.