Who is Winning in Ukraine?

I have been asked who is winning in Ukraine. That in itself is a good question. The definition of winning in this war is a challenge in itself. Ukraine has had more positive outcomes in the last two years than Russia has.  

Ukraine wants to return to the 2014 borders and the return of Crimea. The loss of Crimea would be a massive prestige blow to Mad Vlad, but of little strategic or economic loss. The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) has just about rendered Crimea and the Black Sea as unusable for Russia. Russia has lost about 50% of their Black Sea fleet to a country that doesn’t have a Navy. Also, Russia recently lost another Ground Controlled Intercept station to a drone/missile attack.  

The Russian Air Force is much more dependent on Ground Controlled Intercept than NATO is. (Throw that on the list of handicaps they can’t seem to manage like crateology vs pallets, rail bound logistics.) The Russian A-50 AWACS like bird is not as robust as the NATO version. There are also fewer of them after the losses over the last few weeks.  Throw in the loss of maintainers, pilots, A-50 crews, and losses to ground control staff is diminishing their effectiveness.  This has led to more demands on the A-50s rising their risk levels. The main air offensive power would seem to be from their TU-95 fleet with cruise missiles and drones. I’m waiting to see a solution to TU-95s since they are a good standoff launcher.  

Right now, Russia is stalled short term. Their tube artillery has burned out tubes. They have had five major accidents(?) at defense plants, with the most recent being a plant that manufactures cruise missiles and other missile components. They also recently lost an oil refinery.

NATO is trying to make up for the loss of U.S. support. The main issue is artillery ammo as the 105mm seems to have been replaced w/155. Europe is trying to increase production and the U.S. wants to increase our production to 300K rounds per month. One thing that gives me chills is that if Russia had come west in the 80s…  NATO could have run out of arillery munitions.

Ukraine army chief Valeri Zaluzhny was called to a meeting at the president’s office and told he was being fired. He is being replaced by Oleksandr Syrskyi, the commander of Ukraine’s land forces, as the new commander-in-chief.

Sourced from Preston Stewart on X.

List of military reforms presented by Ukrainian President Zelensky:

A realistic, detailed action plan for the Armed Forces of Ukraine for 2024 must be presented. It must take into account the real situation on the battlefield now and the prospects.

Each combat brigade on the first line must receive effective Western weapons, and there must be a fair redistribution of such weapons in favor of the first line.

The logistics problems must be resolved. Avdiivka must not wait for the generals to find out which warehouses the drones are stuck in.

Every general must know the front. If a general does not know the front, he does not serve Ukraine.

The excessive and unjustified number of personnel in the headquarters must be adjusted.

An effective rotation system must be established in the army. The experience of certain combat brigades of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and units of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, where such a system is in place, can be used as a basis. Rotations are a must.

There is an obvious need to improve the quality of training for the warriors – only trained soldiers can be on the front line.

A new type of forces is being created in the structure of the Armed Forces – the Unmanned Systems Forces. The first commander is to be appointed.

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Carl began his military career as a Marine Sergeant stationed in various locations, including Japan and Camp Pendleton, before shifting gears to become an Elementary Special Education teacher and working in EMS in Flagstaff in 1977. Opting out of Marine Corps duties in 1978, he joined the Army in January 1979, directly reporting to the Intelligence School at Fort Huachuca. Throughout the early 1980s, he served as a Middle East Analyst for the 82nd Airborne Division and later aided in preparing the deployment of the first US Battalion to the Multinational Force and Observers in February 1982.

Transitioning roles, he became a Middle East Analyst for XVIIIth Airborne Corps, contributing to Operation Urgent Fury. In 1984, he joined the Ranger Regiment and later attended the University of Maryland in Heidelberg, graduating in 1988. Assigned to 1st Special Forces Command at Fort Bragg in 1989, he found himself deploying to Desert Storm in 1990 as an Intelligence Sergeant. Post-war, he continued his service in various intelligence management roles, completing his MA in International Relations before retiring.

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