Hell in Helmand

The following is an excerpt from: Visual Friendlies, Tally Target Volume II: Surges (Chapter 16 – Few Among “The Few”)”; Casemate Publishers (April 2026)

The truck bearing casualties finally arrived at the VSP, with all casualties accounted for. Assisting in the collection of the wounded, it was evident to Cummings and the Marine operators that two of the ANA soldiers had been shot in the back—friendly fire—likely from the simple lack of fire discipline by the regular Afghan soldiers. Three others had no discernible injuries, and another had an enemy 7.62-mm round lodged in his forehead and was somehow still conscious and requesting a return to the frontline. Amid the continued gunfight, Cummings began coordinating a medevac flight to the VSP to collect the wounded.

An MSOT sniper identified an enemy firing position wielding a PKM—a heavy machine gun which fires rimmed rifle cartridges, capable of tremendous volleys of fire and able to degrade even the heavy mud walls of Afghan compounds. The team leader directed the Mk-19 gunner to continue to suppress the location, which appeared to be reinforced behind some kind of dugout revetment in the terrain. Before releasing Villain from the ROZ, Cummings directed another rocket attack from the gunships, who were holding off to the east of the VSP, successfully destroying the PKM position while the MSOT sniper observed the effects. Villain flight, now empty of weapons and low on fuel, departed the airspace.

Three hours after sunrise, Cummings and the team leader conversed on the battlefield situation, assessing all friendlies were essentially pinned down and unable to move, and relayed to the JOC the declaration of a TIC. The next transmission relayed that they would receive Navy F/A-18s from an aircraft carrier in the Indian ocean (callsign Devildriver), and a B-1 bomber, while the next set of gunships, British AH-64 Apaches (callsign Angry) were inbound. “No idea what I was going to do
with Bone [B-1], despite us having the OEF rules of engagement, dropping heavy bombs in 2013 simply wasn’t an option. But I’ll take their Sniper pod regardless.”

The engagement never subsided, even after the first successful attacks by Villain. The sequence of attacks became a blur in Cummings’s recollection, where both the ANA and Afghan commandos would relay a contact report, which he would confirm via aircraft sensors, and then prosecute with approval from the team leader. He would repeat this process whenever the MSOT shooters on the compound wall were able to positively identify enemy locations near the VSP. The conversations between Cummings and the team leader were extremely contracted, often little more than an explanation of the next target, nearest friendlies, and selected asset/munition, to which the latter would give a thumbs up while continuing to battle track the force, return fire himself, and coordinate with the JOC on the scheme of battle.

“We ended up using the Mk-19 to mark targets for the gunships, just something that totally worked and arose as an internal TTP [tactics, techniques, and procedures]. The trust between Phil [the team leader] and I was profound. I joke about Marine JTACs that, when everything goes crazy, everyone looks at us with wide eyes and says ‘Make the bad man stop,’ but it’s the truth. I’m not worried about getting denied a strike, we had everything we needed to prevent the enemy seizing the advantage here, and they were easy enough to find and interdict.” The rotary wing would prove to be the decisive asset of this battle, at least insofar as the JTAC and team leader could prevent the loss of more Afghan forces. “We knew by this point—several hours into the battle—that the ANA weren’t going to proceed any further, and our … commandos simply weren’t going to be able to push the ANA onward. So we had to make the decision to contain the outcome. The mission evolved into getting everyone back to the VSP without taking more losses. Rotary wing would achieve that objective.”

The conditions were set to receive the medevac asset, and the MSOT team readied for the incoming helicopter to collect the wounded. At this point, Cummings had counted seven separate RPG shots taken at helicopters in the airspace overhead since the movement to contact began. Bringing in the medevac bird would require a dynamic solution with fires to ensure they could safely land the aircraft and exfiltrate it with the wounded Afghans. “Dustoff finally rolled in, and this was the quintessential hot LZ [landing zone], I held them off to the east, notifying them that I would be suppressing that tree line north of the VSP with the gunships thirty seconds prior to Dustoff touching down.”

Dustoff was the universal callsign for UH-60 Black Hawk medical helicopters, the iconic life-flight assets of the War on Terror, emblazoned with a large red cross on a white square denoting they were an unarmed aircraft for medical use only. Insurgents rarely cared for the Geneva Conventions which designate shooting at medical facilities, units, or equipment as constituting a war crime, and countless
life-flight aircraft were shot at during the 20-year war. Cummings was not about to let that happen on this medevac.

After setting deconfliction, Dustoff rolled in, loaded the casualties, and departed eastward, bound for Camp Bastion, while the gunships and members of the MSOT manning the VSP walls poured suppressive fire into the trees. Fortunately, the medevac bird made a safe exfil and no further RPGs were fired. At this point, a lull overtook the battlefield, as was often the case in firefights with insurgents—inexplicably, the contact drew down and only sporadic reports of continued enemy fire came in from the ANA front. Cummings had “winchestered” (expended all ordnance) three different sets of helicopter gunships. The JOC had notified the team leader the team would not be receiving any additional aircraft, even retasking the B-1 due to the saturation of rotary wing assets. With the growing quiet settling in, soon they were left with only the Scan Eagle providing overhead sensors. “I settled into forward observer mode, using our organic 60-mm mortars since we had used all available CAS. Our team mortarman knew how to drive nails with that handheld system too, so for the remainder of the day, we held squat at the VSP.”

The mission essentially ended there. Knowing full well the ANA would proceed no further along the river, the Afghan commandos directed the retrograde of the force back along its original advance, with various ALP checkpoint personnel returning to their respective outposts. In summary, eight hours elapsed between initial contact to recovering the force at the VSP. “The Afghans thought it was a resounding success, the ANA and ALP were happy about getting outside the wire. Normal post-mission
feedback: air assets killed everything and left no enemy alive, but the ANA failed at giving us specific numbers for the battlefield-damage assessment. We packed up our Afghan commandos and headed back to our FOB.”

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Publisher listing (also available on Amazon, Barnes & Noble and online retailers): Visual Friendlies, Tally Target: How Close Air Support in the War on Terror Changed the Way America Made War – Casemate Publishers US.

Ethan Brown served 11 years in the United States Air Force as a Special Warfare JTAC, with multiple combat deployments. He is the author of the “Visual Friendlies, Tally Target” book trilogy about air power and forward air controllers in the post-9/11 wars. His work has been featured in the Diplomatic Courier, War on the Rocks, Task & Purpose, the Modern War Institute (West Point), Defense One and several other publications. He is on X @Libertystoic and IG @ethanbrownauthor.

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