“Design Thinking” is the willingness to deeply understand a problem from many, many angles. From empathizing with an issue and causes that it affects to challenging assumptions and becoming innovative, Design Thinking creates deliberate time and space not only to tackle the obvious challenge but allows a person or team to identify things that weren’t even considered to begin with. If done well, the divergent and convergent cycle allows the team to discover multiple causes to the problem, define the Where, Why, and Hows the problem exists and then the Whos and the Whats it requires for the challenge to be solved. Creatively the Design Team deduces all the possible solutions and then determines what the best solution is. With all this divergent thinking happening, design members can expand their creativeness and sharpen their talents by learning from other, diverse teammates.
But when there is so much brain energy focused and being applied to a challenge, “spin out” will likely happen and some of these collateral bits of information remain valuable. These ideas help with other possible outcomes, different options, identify risks and contingencies not initially considered. Those collateral “post-it notes” that remain up on the board not necessarily considered into the plan or solution should still be consolidated, reevaluated, and utilized as test criteria. Without a deliberate design function, planning becomes very ad-hoc, reactionary, stale and predictable. This often lacks creativeness due to time and the tendency of structured institutionalism.
Visionaries, change agents, and sponsors that want to be innovative and creative tend to live with the risk of being outcasted by naysayers, bullies or those that are unable to think unconventional. What a shame to have the best idea in the room ridiculed, muted, or canceled just because an idea is different. But “different” needs to be encouraged.
It’s interesting that the words “Middle Management” are often brought up on who does Design Thinking. I think this is quite true but also predictable. Lower management predictably execute the plan and hopefully they are being mentored the right way to become tomorrow’s middle management Design Thinkers. Exposed to both doctrine and real-world experience, Middle Management team members typically bring to a design team certain credentials, proven competencies, and credibility. Higher Management is very much in the position to be the deciders, the approvers and responsible for the decision to implement the plan. They are the ones that have been in both lower positions and have witnessed success, failure, and the value of good planning while occupying the middle chair. You can see this model in almost every military hierarchy. The key to success though is when a Higher Management leader, that fearlessly encourages and solicits ideas that may not be orthodox recognizes the possibilities of new, fresh, and unique ideas, feels the freedom to create and express amongst his tribe.
VIGNETTE:
I like this blurb in ADP 6-0 Mission Command;
“Military operations are inherently human endeavors, characterized by violence and continuous adaptation by all participants. Successful execution requires Army forces to make and implement effective decisions faster than enemy forces. Therefore, the Army has adopted mission command as its approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.”
On the battlefield, the conditions are always changing. What the pre-mission brief COIST team told 1st Platoon about the route being cleared two hours ago doesn’t necessarily consider that, right now the enemy is emplacing a roadside bomb before the platoon rolls out the gate. The enemy doesn’t know the planned route for today’s patrol or that the platoon plans on making a stop at the local orphanage in the same vicinity of the emplacement. The emplacer is only going off the knowledge of patterns and routines the Platoon were carefully trying not to set, but ultimately did. Luckily, the local nationals will give the platoon a tip during the orphanage visit that they should avoid the route heading north out of town, for they fear the platoon will be struck by the bomb. As a matter fact, the local nationals will tell them where the trigger man currently is located, and it will become a matter for the leaders of determining if the platoon should conduct a raid in a reasonably pro-US forces neighborhood.
After receiving the tip, the call is made back to the patrol base to update the Commander, who has just returned from the weekly Squadron BUB and has received intel and updated PIR from his boss. The tip checks out, but time is of the essence. The situation doesn’t afford the Commander to gear up and make link up in sector. The commander knows the Platoon Leader and competencies of the platoon; he has seen and validated them in training and trusts them. This has become a time sensitive target and he instructs his LT to form a plan and execute; a decentralized decision from leader to subordinate.
Adaptability, Innovativeness, Competency, Maturity, and Common Understanding of the bigger picture of what the Troop’s mission as battle space owners is what the Commander has stressed at every Troop function since arriving in country. Those are his guiding principles and along with that has embraced Mission Command in his Command Philosophy. During pre-deployment training he challenged his platoons to work decentralized, in small teams and be able to creatively solve challenges within narrow time constraints and limited resources.
Back at the orphanage, the LT is excited, but is calm enough in his resolve not to be predictable or rush to failure. He gathers not just leaders from the platoon, but also Soldiers he trusts and who have displayed certain creativeness in the back of his MRAP. They begin brainstorming about the current domain they find themselves; balancing between Obvious and Complicated. Had there been no tip today, the challenge would reside within the Complex or the Chaotic realms of the Cynefin Framework if there had been no signs before an attack. The neighborhood, the resources available, the perceptions of the local nationals, past raids, and battle drills that they have conducted are all considered and quickly analyzed. They have also clarified the mission. This is a kill or capture mission with criteria of limited damage inside the target house and surrounding infrastructure to avoid collateral damage. This leads to many challenges, but the leaders are diligent to throw everything out on the table; divergently thinking through the good ideas, the bad ideas and even the crazy ideas they thought up on guard duty last week. They red-team the “what-ifs?” and focus individually on identified risks. They considered contingencies and past AAR revelations. They are a well oil machine and even though not every question was answered and not every aspect was known, it was time for the plan to be codified and briefed.
Having settled on a plan, the LT reaches across to his adjacent platoon who is operating just out of sector but who is open to assist. The plan was for the other platoon to create a distraction in vicinity of the location of the IED to focus the triggerman’s full attention elsewhere while 1st Platoon moves to contact to infiltrate, find, fix, and finish the enemy.
The plan is executed without incident, capturing the insurgent and both platoons return to base to reflect on their actions. The Commander receives a full debrief and the trust in his platoons to think creatively, plan effectively and execute safely during operations solidifies the factor in Mission Command; Trust. His innovative training methodology back at home station was brilliantly validated; the empowering of his subordinates to use what they see and have in real time to think and plan for mission success and end state accomplishment. The Analyze, Design, Develop, Implement and Evaluate (ADDIE) model was the simplest model trained to the Soldiers and was fully on display during the mission. Design thinking here allowed a young, innovative platoon leader to command and control his unit with fluidity and adaptiveness to an unknown situation and terrain rather than by descriptive orders that normally restrict a plan to defined parameters.
In this example, the age of the modern, adaptable, and innovative Soldier emerges and complements the methodology of Mission Command. The younger Soldiers in 1st Platoon trusted their leaders to think and the leaders trusted their subordinates to execute all with the same goal; the same end state. There were no step-by-step orders to adhere to. The fire teams were given the freedom of maneuver and resorted back to the art of warfighting, rather than the science.
“The only wrong decision is the decision not to act.”
A MUCH-NEEDED CULTURE SHIFT
Williamson Murray’s six recommendations for building a culture of innovation states military leadership can affect the innovation process through long-term cultural changes rather than short-term decisions. Here, we can discuss the pros and cons, cause, and effects, of changing out Command teams every two years; a relatively short time for leaders to be in the seat and affect long-term cultural change. But I think what is necessary is innovation and inclusion of critical thinking, open debate, detailed analysis, development of new concepts of warfare, prevention of doctrinal rigidity and tolerance towards failure. In the realm of Special Operations Forces, I think this culture inherently resides within its personnel and, to an equal extent, the civilians and contractors that support them. SOF serves the shining beacon on the hill of what conventional forces should aspire to in thinking and plans development.
As a former Combined Training Center (CTC) survivor and OCT/Mentor, it would be interesting if the CTCs were not driven by just a passing score or GO/NO GO criteria but treated as a living, breathing simulated battle labs to serve as a real-life simulation to practice design, validate TTPs and stress processes and equipment. I know there is room for change, growth, and innovation in this pivotal domain. I’m thinking a literal war behind the fences of JRTC and NTC that never ever ends. These CTC rotations serve well as crucible events that validate a unit. However, being witness to the same rotation after rotation which looked like a cookie cutter, institutionalized exercise in just proving the basics skills to deploy downrange, in the end it seemed kind of silly. The unit leadership was always under pressure to do well, but almost paralyzed by the fear of failure. A lot rode on the overall outcome; success/ failure; win/lose, commendations or ridicule; promotion or being passed over; hierarchy within the chain of command or ultimately being relieved. That’s a lot of pressure… it WAS a lot of pressure!
To get the go ahead to deploy to the CTC, the unit practiced basics back at home station during the train up. That’s where they found unity of Team, built their SOPs, and rehearsed battle drills. But to truly innovative is to be unpredictable; not become bound by trends or patterns. This is where the CTCs should innovate. The CTC should allow those incoming units to practice those basics at home for train up and be fed real-time intelligence about their upcoming rotation from the unit currently participating in their own exercises. Once the unit arrives, the exercise should “begin and end” or “transition” with both units on ground at the same time, conducting a RIP/TOA and the new unit open to whatever the current conditions of the battlefield, the centers of gravity and the current attitude of the population is that the previous unit influenced. The basics then only serve as the basics but what is being tested is the ability to read the current operating environment, adapt, innovate for survival but also with the goal of making the environment better for the next unit coming in; 30 days later. If there is failure, well it’s all part of the lesson; like in life.
But if you can’t define what success is, then how do you determine failure? The obvious is you could evaluate the basics and have Go/No Go criteria. But the real test of the CTC becomes the stability of the current operating environment. Now, we are testing the human dynamic. We are seeing how our troops and leadership deal with potential failures in the basics but also how they can justify either success or failure of their overall efforts. This is what has become Outcome Based Training; something I have always embraced. If units were stressed and tested against an on-going, living model, then when real world things like the Ukraine erupt, we will have validated dozens of Brigade Combat Teams and their leadership to enter and operate in ambiguous conditions and have learned to deal with failures of outcomes; not failures in standards.
As it stands right now, an All-Source analyst could participate in a CTC rotation, PCS and be right back at the same CTC with his/her new unit and do the same exact scenario with the same injects all over again. Predictable. But to test a unit against unpredictability is to be ok with less-than-favorable outcomes. This would also energize the importance of mentorship and bonding amongst leadership versus the competitiveness that often cripples unit’s effectiveness and morale. To learn to expect failure and learn how to respond effectively would be the true test. That’s a culture change. Instead of always putting the pieces back to the predetermine positions back on the chess board after ENDEX, the game would continue on and on. There would be no predictability except it being a complex challenge with the overall goal of not allowing it to slip into chaos.
Of course, CTC rotations come at a real monetary cost and the Army wants to capitalize on that cost by immersing their units into realistic, predictable, institutionalized training for as long as they can to standardize effectiveness and bring value to the “Why” reason they are there. This mentality only serves an institutional way of operating. Should the CTCs adopt a model of operating outside the norm, embrace unpredictability and become okay with accepting failure, they would be throwing the book of standardization out the window and bringing in a new, innovative way to prepare future leaders in this new world paradigm we find ourselves in currently.
It does come across as naïve and idealistic, but maybe that’s the beauty of design thinking.
DEVELOP AND REMEMBER THE “WHY?”
Commanders Intent and End State serve the purpose of the “Why?” This is one of the most important questions to ultimately answer for the campaign plan because it forms legitimacy in reason, risk, and buy-in. However, it is also a question that is echoed the most going into a pre-mission brief or OPORD. We all want to know “Why?” Hopefully, by the end of an often-exhaustive brief, the “Why” has been answered or at least collectively understood by all involved. Yet, how many times have you exited a brief not having a clear understanding of the overall Why. Maybe a local level Why, but not the strategic level Why.
The ability to effectively understand and comprehend the end state allows for trusted, decentralized leadership in dynamic, ambiguous, vague, and chaotic operational environments. Collective understanding of the Why creates Purpose. The Nazis were defeated because Hitler was bad for the future of the world. The Japanese were defeated because of the attacks on Pearl Harbor and the AXIS alignment with Germany and Italy. Al Qaeda was defeated because of the attack on the Twin Towers and our way of life. Purpose drove those operations. But why were we in Iraq? WMD, really? Why did we fight the Taliban for 20 years? Peace and stability, really? As soon as there is misunderstanding to the Why, then there is no defined rhyme or reason.
The Why must be clear and concise; easy for everyone to understand and adopt as their purpose. If the leader trusts his subordinates to soundly accomplish the understood Why, then this is what we have learned to call Mission Command. Mission Command has been developed from the reliance on obtaining outcomes rather than accomplishing rigorous standards on an arbitrary timeline while pushing the decision making to the lowest level. Where we get ourselves in trouble is when we combine the Why statement with a dependence on adhering to a strict timetable.
Soldiers and Sailors were gone from home in WWII for four (+) years and then they declared victory. Their purpose sustained through the conflict. However, Soldiers in Iraq, Afghanistan and Vietnam rotated in & out on predictable timelines. The Why became clouded and shrouded. And ultimately, no one has ever declared a victory in either of those wars. What design really gets at is clarity in outcome, hopefully favorable to applied efforts. Strategically, I had to tune into the State Of The Union Address once a year to understand the Commander-In-Chief’s intent on the GWOT. It shouldn’t be that way. When all else fails, the Why will continue to sustain the operation when other considerations have been altered or canceled. But the tendency to shortcut plans and effects are often the outcomes to strictly holding to a timeline; ask any OC at one of the CTCs or worse, look at the botched withdrawals of both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Oddly, our perception of time exists in both the finite and the infinite simultaneously. We arbitrarily overlay self-imposed finite timelines on what we perceive as an infinite timeline of life. These self-imposed restraints trick us into thinking that we can control time and the tempo of operations against an unpredictable universe and an enemy who always enjoys the luxury of a vote. Within the Cynefin Framework, one could assume that as you work counterclockwise through the domains, the importance of time stays the same but is systematically viewed as narrowing or shortening the closer you get to the Chaotic domain. When viewed in a holistic approach, an operation will take as long as it takes, period.
Ever notice the calmer you stay in a situation, the more time it seems like you have? When bound by an analytical approach of conducting an operation, time is used in planning criteria often to a detriment; it is the proverbial handcuffs you put on yourself, or the plan, and erases the ability to remain flexible. Missing a timeline is often viewed as a failure or a disappointment. Einstein stated that time is relevant. Therefore, I’ve taken issue to arbitrary training timelines, such as finding four errors in a rigged cargo bag during Air Assault school determines whether you are a GO or NO GO. In the real world, a Soldier will have hours to plan, rig and inspect a load. I mean, we can’t even have a morning formation without showing up 15 minutes early to the 10-minute form-up prior deadline. Evaluate the outcome, not the arbitrary time it takes. Again, answering “Why is it important to find the errors in the rigging?” is more important than why making it two minutes to find the errors is important. Focus on accomplishing Outcomes versus adherence to a Task, Condition and Standard.
In that sense then, Design works well in the non-traditional decision-making models. By using the triple loop learning model above (courtesy of the Joint Special Operations University Design Thinking Course), the design team can get after the numerous questions of the Whats and the Hows to ultimately formulate and agree on a standing Why rationale for everyone involved to understand and put their effort behind. If you have multiple different understandings or lack of understandings of the Why, then the strategic outcome is susceptible to lack of unity of effort and understanding – CHAOS. When looking at a traditional MDMP model, the Commanders intent is initially given and later refined through Course of Action Development. The last output in the model is “Subordinates understand the plan or order.” This is supposed to mean that the subordinates understand the plan and they finally understand and own the “Why?”
Yet, when I used to OC at NTC or JRTC, after the OPORD and while REDCON One, I would walk the line and ask the driver, the gunner, or the junior truck commander, “So, why are we doing this?” In several augmentee rotations, I never, got an answer that spoke to the two levels higher intended outcome. I would then ask them, “Ok, tell me what YOUR Task & Purpose is? They were always well rehearsed on this answer since it was part of their PCC’s. But when I asked, “OK, so what is the Significance of your actions to the bigger picture?”, as in, overall operational and strategic significance, they didn’t know how their plan fed into the bigger “Why” except, to “Win the battle, Sarge!” You don’t need a clearance or a pair of shiny stars to know the “Why.” The Why shouldn’t be some deep secret that the enemy is trying to figure out. It should be obvious to everyone involved. Maybe it’s the nature of a fictional exercise. But at this level, where the boots hit the dirt, Soldiers should understand the intent and end state. These are the Ways and Means the Why becomes an Ends. How you properly identify and define the Why is through deliberate, non-traditional Design thinking and planning.
Don’t Win the Battle, Win the Why.
INNOVATION
Innovation is the pursuit for change; the cause or action. It answers the want to change.
Therefore, Adaptation is the result of change; the effect or reaction. The answer of a need to change.
My cute little graph above shows the life of both innovation and adaptation. Here, I attempt to show that innovation is caused to be ahead of the boom and adaptation is the result of the boom. This easily applies to technologies, techniques, tactics, and procedures.
Innovation requires an acceptance of destructive, disruptive and guerilla thinking. Anyone regimented to liner thinking, for example where A+B=C, is naturally going to be uncomfortable with the process of innovation. That’s because pursuing innovation resides in the realm of unpredictability and inefficiency. To restrict or govern the time, resources and how the innovation process proceeds will determine how effective the innovation process results in a new way to adapt to changes needed for preservation of a person, place, thing, or action. Innovation is the shining of a flashlight into the dark, mysterious corners of the universe just to see what’s there and then harnessing what was found just to see if it brings value to the traditional and familiar things we use every day.
However, once established, it is not to say that an innovative design cannot be refined into a predictable and efficient end-product or process. If the newly found product or process still brings renewed value, then I believe adaptation is the ultimate result of innovation. It was once told to me that once a new technology is formed, it doesn’t take long for it to find its way to the battlefield. And if you just look at commercial-off-the-shelf drones or Starlink antennas, I couldn’t agree more with this statement. These are just two recent examples of innovation brought forth from the public sector that the militaries have decided to adopt into their adaptability portfolio.
THE DESIGN APPROACH TO PLANNING
First, Identifying The Mess. This is done in such a way as to capture and illuminate the essential systemic properties of the mess, not by listing independently formulated threats and opportunities, but by projecting the future that the system would have if its environment were to continue behaving as they are. The mess that a system currently is in, is the future it will be in, if it does not change its course.
Second, Ends Planning. Such planning involves selecting the ideals, objectives, and goals to be pursued. This is done by preparing an idealized redesign of the system planned for, a design with which its stakeholders would replace the existing system right now if they were free to replace it with any system they wanted. The differences between the present and the most desired future of the organization is headed for, defines the gaps to be filled by the remainder of the planning process.
Third, Means Planning. Here the ways of filling the gaps are selected. These are more likely to require invention than discovery. They too are usually the products of design. Therefore, creativity has at least as large a role to play in selecting means as analytic evaluation.
Fourth, Resource Planning. Five types of resources are involved: people; facilities and equipment; materials and energy; money; and information, knowledge, and understanding. A determination is made of how much of each type of resource will be required by the means selected, and when these requirements will arise. Then it is necessary to determine whether, and how, these requirements can be met. If they are found to be infeasible, the previously formulated ends or means must be modified and the cycle repeated until a match is obtained between actions to be taken and resources to be available.
Fifth and finally, The Design of Implementation and Control. Decisions are made as to Who is to do What, When, Where and How their behavior, and its effects, are to be monitored and modified when necessary.
These five phases of design-oriented planning are carried out as participatively as possible, ideally providing all stakeholders with an opportunity to take part. Stakeholders are organized into small planning teams, and these are managed so as to assure coordination and integration of their efforts. The planning process is also designed to facilitate continuous improvement of plans and continuous organizational and individual learning, adaptation, and development.
Design-oriented planners have responsibility for revealing the potential uses of research, for designing and conducting it so as to provide useful inputs to the planning process, and, of great importance, for revealing the limitations of research and showing where judgment is required to supplement it. They should also show how judgment can be monitored and controlled so it can be improved rapidly and effectively. The participation of stakeholders in design-oriented planning is structured to the extent necessary to carry out each of its five phases. Moreover, the participants are coached by the professionals in the methodology of planning, in the design and conduct of research, and in the organization and operation of productive teams.
Thus, design-oriented planners have responsibility for continuous development of the participants and for developing both the form and content of the process of their development. In addition, they have responsibility for removing the principal obstruction to the future they most desire: self-imposed constraints. Planners must convince stakeholders that most of the constraints they believe to be imposed on them are actually self-imposed. Planners can do this only after they realize that most of the constraints to which they are subjected to are also self-imposed.
Literally, how we get better is that we get out of our own damn way! Paradoxically, this is truly the Way and the Why of Design Thinking.
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This first appeared in The Havok Journal on April 16, 2024.
Robb is a retired active Army veteran of 21 years, primarily serving as a Cavalry Scout. Having accomplished multiple combat tours, diverse global assignments and leadership roles, Robb retired as a First Sergeant of Shadow Troop, 1-33 CAV (Rakassans). From there, Robb went on to attempt his luck in the civilian sector as a Reliability Engineer at an international paper processing company during the pandemic. Not quite satisfied and feeling the draw to serve once again, Robb made his way back behind the gate working with some of the nation’s tip of spear warfighters on Fort Liberty, NC.
It was during this time that he was drawn into an esoteric spiritual journey of self-discovery and began peeling back the onion of how vanquishing spiritual warfare can serve as a personal force multiplier. Dropping all ties to dogmatic religious principles, Robb solely embarked into studies of the mystical and metaphysical for the answers of life. Now forged with this newfound purpose, Robb blends his current path of spiritual ascension along with his past experience of the rigors of military service in order to uplift the future of his brothers and sisters in arms.
“The answers we all seek lie in potential.”
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