Pecuniam Infinitum, Belli Infinitum: The Aid You’re Giving Gaza is Making the Conflict Worse

In the timeless crucible of conflict, the old adage “nervos belli, pecuniam infinitam”—the sinews of war, infinite money—has never been more keenly felt. Originally conjuring images of states doling out unending funds to fuel military might, today it captures another insidious reality: well-intentioned humanitarian assistance, pouring unrestrained into conflict zones, is paradoxically prolonging the very wars it seeks to end.

The Study That Shows How Aid Turns Into Ammunition

A groundbreaking study by Professor Netta Barak‑Corren of the Hebrew University and Dr. Jonathan Boxman, published via the Social Science Research Network, reveals a grim truth: humanitarian aid is frequently diverted—through theft, taxation, inflated beneficiary lists, or direct concessions—to armed groups, corrupt officials, or repressive regimes in war-torn regions like Somalia, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Gaza.

The numbers are staggering—for instance, in Somalia, close to 85–87.5% of aid never reaches genuine recipients, consumed instead by transportation cartels, ghost camps, and power brokers. Similarly, in Ethiopia, hundreds of tons of grain are siphoned off by military-controlled militias to feed soldiers, with aid agencies reportedly turning a blind eye. In Syria, Assad’s regime reaps roughly half of all aid by forcing discounted currency conversions, and in Gaza, aid agencies like UNRWA are implicated in the diversion of essential supplies.

The study’s core conclusion: aid diversion isn’t a malfunction—it’s systemic. Rather than alleviating suffering, unconditioned aid bankrolls war, reinforcing resistance and enabling prolonged conflict.

When Good Intentions Fuel Conflict

To paraphrase the findings of the above-cited study, unlimited aid—without accountability—is war in disguise. The flowing money becomes de facto supply lines for warlords, criminals, and autocrats. Every misdirected dollar becomes part of the battle, every aid truck a potential war machine.

The aid becomes the sinews of a never-ending war.

This “nervos belli” dynamic has several dimensions:

• Economic Incentives for War: As political economy models like the “greed vs. grievance” framework (Collier‑Hoeffler) suggest, conflicts persist when rebels or regimes have access to resources that lower the cost of war—aid being one of them.
• The Aid Curse: Similar to the “resource curse,” large and unconditioned aid flows can undermine accountability, entrench patronage systems, and reduce a government’s incentive to develop revenue structures or responsive institutions.
• Structural Normalization: Over time, the humanitarian system becomes co-opted by armed actors demanding concessions—taxation, staff placement, operational restrictions, also known as “rent-seeking” behavior—simply to operate. Aid agencies, trapped between moral imperative and hostile realities, often comply .

Toward Reform, Not Retreat

This is not a call to end humanitarian assistance—it’s a rallying cry to reform it. The authors urge frank acknowledgment of the trade-offs, and if necessary, halting operations where diversion is unavoidable, or securing delivery through accountable intermediaries.

There are some actionable potential reforms for donors: conditional funding, transparency mandates, security integration, whistleblower protections, “sunset clauses” for long missions, and tech‑enhanced monitoring like QR tracking. These tools offer a way to shift aid from fueling conflict to mending those worse affected by it, thereby protecting civilians without underwriting–and prolonging–war.

Conclusion: Reclaiming “Nervos Belli, Pecuniam Infinitam”

In an age of unending wars, we must reject the Faustian bargain of endless aid for peace. Instead, let’s reframe “nervos belli, pecuniam infinitam” as a cautionary maxim: when aid becomes infinite without accountability, it doesn’t build peace—it muscles conflict.

___________

Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Charles Faint served 27 years in the US Army, including seven combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan with various Special Operations Forces units. He also completed operational assignments in Egypt, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea. He is the owner of The Havok Journal and the executive director of the Second Mission Foundation. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not reflect those of the US Government or any other person or entity.

As the Voice of the Veteran Community, The Havok Journal seeks to publish a variety of perspectives on a number of sensitive subjects. Unless specifically noted otherwise, nothing we publish is an official point of view of The Havok Journal or any part of the U.S. government.